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SOLOMON'S SWORD: ADJUDICATION OF CHILD CUSTODY
QUESTIONSt
Robert E. Shepherd, Jr.*
Then the king said, "The one says, "This is my son that is alive,
and your son is dead'; and the other says, 'No; but your son is dead,
and my son is the living one."' And the king said, "Bring me a
sword." So a sword was brought before the king. And the king said,
"Divide the living child in two, and give half to the one, and half to
the other." Then the woman whose son was alive said to the king,
because her heart yearned for her son, "Oh, my lord, give her the
living child, and by no means slay it." But the other said, "It shall
be neither mine nor yours; divide it." Then the king answered and
said, "Give the living child to the first woman, and by no means slay
it; she is its mother."
1 Kings 3:23-27 (RSV)
I. INTRODUCTION
It is significant that this story from the reign of King Solomon in
the tenth century B.C. uses as its setting a battle over child custody
to illustrate the legendary "wisdom of Solomon."' It is equally
meaningful that after the passage of some three thousand years of
civilization and supposed social progress, a twentieth century Amer-
ican judge could remark that "a judge agonizes more about reaching
the right result in a contested custody issue than about any other
type decision he renders."2 And this agony intrudes into an ever-
increasing number of cases.
* Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth of Virginia and Lecturer in Law, T. C.
Williams School of Law; LL.B., Washington and Lee University, 1961.
t The substance of this article appeared in a paper delivered before an institute on "What
Are 'the Best Interests of the Child' in Custody Proceedings?" sponsored by the School of
Social Work of Virginia Commonwealth University on March 2-3 and April 6-7, 1973. The
views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the
views of the Office of the Attorney General of Virginia.
1. Professor Henry Foster has pointed out that this story has also "sowed the seeds of
superstition" by implicitly asserting the validity of the "blood is thicker than water" shibbol-
eth. Foster, Adoption and Child Custody: Best Interests of the Child?, 22 BunF. L. REv. 1
(1973).
2. B. BOTEIN, TRIAL JUDGE 273 (1952).
3. For example, in 1969 there were approximately 69,700,000 children under the age of
eighteen in the United States and during that same year there were an estimated 840,000
children involved in divorce proceedings, another 171,000 children under twenty-one were
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It has been estimated that in 1960 there were about 64,000,000
children under eighteen with approximately 3,300,000 living with a
parent who was separated or divorced, and another 5,000,000 chil-
dren were living with a parent who was previously divorced but had
remarried-a total of almost thirteen per cent of all children under
eighteen.' It would not be unrealistic to posit that between fifteen
and twenty per cent of all children under eighteen will be involved
in some legal determination of their custody-contested or uncon-
tested-during their childhood.
It is not merely the greater statistical intrusion of child custody
issues upon our collective consciousness that motivates us to re-
examine the processes by which these determinations are made.
Legal battles over the custody of children have recently leaped from
the cloistered halls of justice and the antiseptic pages of appellate
courts' opinions to the slick sheets of popular magazines and the
blaring headlines of the daily newspapers.5 In addition, the increas-
adopted and an additional 323,000 neglected, emotionally disturbed and dependent children
of that age were in either foster family care or in institutions. Thus, at least nineteen out of
every thousand children under the age of twenty-one were involved in some type of custody
proceeding during that single year. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
United States: 1972, at 8, 305 (1972); U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Vital
Statistics of the United States, 1969: Vol. III Marriage and Divorce 2-9 (1972); White House
Conference on Children, Profiles of Children 147 (1970). See also H. CARTER & P. GUCK,
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDY 36-38, 252-55 (1970).
4. R. CAVAN, THE AMERICAN FAMILY 469 (4th ed. 1969).
5. Three prime examples of this are the cases of Scarpetta v. DiMartino, No. 71-475 (3d
Dist. Ct. App. Fla., Sept. 28, 1971); Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152
(1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966); People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption
Serv., 36 App. Div. 2d 524, 317 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1971), aff'd, 28 N.Y.2d 185, 269 N.E.2d 787
(1971); and the custody case involving Caroline Desramault discussed in Foster, supra note
1, at 6. The Painter case involved a determination by the Iowa Supreme Court that four-year-
old Mark Painter's welfare was best served by his remaining on an Iowa farm with his elderly
maternal grandparents rather than by his returning to his father who had recently remarried
and was living in the so-called "Bohemian atmosphere" of a San Francisco area art colony.
See H. PAINTER, MARK, I LOVE You (1967). See also Levine, Child Custody: Iowa Corn and
the Avant Garde, 1 FAM. L.Q. 1, 3 (1967); Poteat, Iowa Supreme Court v. Wild Oats, 18
MAINE L. REV. 173 (1966); Note, 8 ARIz. L. REV. 163 (1966); Note, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1710
(1966); Note, 4 HOUST. L. REV. 131 (1966); Note, 51 IowA L. REv. 1114 (1966); Note, 7 J. FAM.
L. 81 (1967); Note, 41 TUL. L. REV. 148 (1966).
The Scarpetta, or "Baby Lenore" case involved an effort by an unwed alien mother to
revoke an adoption where she had previously surrendered the child to an adoption agency,
and the child had been placed with the DiMartinos. Her efforts were successful in New York,
but the DiMartino family moved to Florida where, unlike New York, the adoptive parents
were allowed to be heard, and the Florida court awarded custody to them. See Foster, supra
note 1, at 7-12; Inker, The Adoption of Baby Lenore: Two Interpretations of a Child's Best
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ing public sentiment for re-examination of the divorce laws and the
response of legislative bodies have tended to bring domestic rela-
tions law, or family law, out of the back alleys of the law and into
the spotlight. The reasons for the late emergence of family law into
the forefront of judicial and legislative reform are varied, but Sol
Isaacs, a pioneering spirit among family lawyers, touched on some
of the more crucial impediments to an earlier examination when he
related that:
Perhaps the very nature of family law explains the delay in organiz-
ing effectively to improve it. It has been relatively so much simpler
to compile and coordinate other branches of the law which can be met
with considerable detachment. But in family law one finds emotion,
sentimentality, religious dogma, taboos. Here is opened the Pan-
dora's box of psychiatry and psychology and of those elemental
drives which make man both a god and a beast. A society cannot
exist without family law, but family law has certainly developed
without much legal guidance in modem times. Lawyers have ap-
peared content to leave this area to the ministry or the social sciences.
The truth is that the bar has feared to face family law. It can do so
no longer.7
This article will attempt to deal with some of these "taboos," at
Interest, 11 J. FAM. L. 285 (1971); Inker, Expanding the Rights of Children in Custody and
Adoption Cases, 11 J. FAM. L. 129 (1971); Katz, The Adoption of Baby Lenore: Problems of
Consent and the Role of Lawyers, 5 FAm. L.Q. 405 (1971).
The Caroline Desramault case evoked similar controversy in English and French periodi-
cals in 1972 after a two-year history in the courts of both countries, during which custody of
the children was given first to the father, then joint custody in both parents with alternative
three-month periods of custody in each parent, followed by an award of custody to the
paternal grandmother, another award in favor of the father, and, finally, an award to the
mother which was avoided by the father's flight with the child to Belgium where French
process could be avoided. When the litigation started, the baby was nine months old and at
the time the last decision was made, she was two-and-a-half years old. In the interim the case
had been heard by eight courts with most of the trial court decisions being reversed on appeal.
See Foster, supra note 1, at 6-7 n.17.
6. When the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was formed
in 1892, marriage and divorce, along with commercial paper, were deemed the most insistent
subjects for uniform legislation but it was not until August 6, 1970, that the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act was promulgated. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 176 (1970). It was not until 1958 that the American Bar Association
authorized the formation of the Section of Family Law. Isaac, Family Law and the Lawyer,
2 J. FAM. L. 43, 45-47 (1962).
7. Id. at 44.
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least within the limited context of child custody. There are numer-
ous recent articles dealing broadly with marriage, divorce and child
custody, adoption, and abuse or neglect and dependency proceed-
ings, but few of these articles attempt to deal with the common
thread that runs through all the child custody subareas of juvenile
and family law - the substantive and procedural aspects of termi-
nation of parental or other custodial rights in children and the ensu-
ing placement of custody in a new agency or person." The basic
premise of this article is that there is a unity of procedural ap-
proaches that may be utilized in legislative reform of child custody
laws, while at the same time there can be provided greater recogni-
tion of, and protection for, the child's best interests.
Apart from the increasing incidence of custody adjudications and
the greater public awareness of, and interest in, child custody mat-
ters, there is a broader concern that must be primary in importance;
that concern is society's obvious interest in the development of well-
adjusted and healthy children who will grow into emotionally ma-
ture and contributing citizens. Professor Sanford Katz has effec-
tively articulated this goal:
We say that we expect children to be physically and emotionally
secure; to become responsible citizens in their community and to
become economically independent; to acquire an education and de-
velop skills; to respect people of different races, religions, and na-
tional, social, and economic backgrounds; to become socially respon-
sible and honorable, and to have a sense of family loyalty. There is
evidence that parental affection influences this development.'
Another writer has described the means of achieving this goal, at
least under normal circumstances:
The most important determining factor in the early phases of de-
velopment is the child's dependence upon his parents, whom he needs
not only for physical survival but who are also the most important
objects in his world. The quality of his relations with them determine
the security and satisfaction with which he involves himself with his
external world. From the beginning of life the basic need of the indi-
8. See, e.g., the articles cited in notes 45, 69, 75, 77, 82, 83, 85, 86, 88, 100 and 102, infra.
It should be noted that most of these articles have appeared in print within the past ten years.
9. Katz, Book Review, 64 MICH. L. REV. 756, 763 (1966), citing L. BERKOWrrz, THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF MOTIVES AND VALUES IN THE CHILD (1964).
[Vol. 8:151
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vidual, as part of a psychosocial unit, is to maintain good relations
with his objects - specifically people with whom he has close emo-
tional ties - for only by doing so can he feel secure within himself
and interact successfully with others.'"
When, for one reason or another, the normal parent-child rela-
tionship is disturbed, this parent dependence is disrupted and the
child's need "to maintain good relations with his objects" must be
met by some parent substitute or alteration in the family setting or
normal development of the child will not take place. There need not
be a complete breakdown in the marital relationship to the extent
that one of the parents has left the marital domicile in order to have
a disruption in the child's development pattern. As a matter of fact,
the "effects of marital conflict on children can be more severe than
the effects of divorce or separation."'" Dr. Louise Despert, in her
classic study of the effects of divorce on children, postulated that,
contrary to her initial speculation, it was not divorce itself "but the
emotional situation in the home, with or without divorce, that is the
determining factor in a child's adjustment," and she described this
factor as "emotional divorce."'' 2 The child of either "emotional" or
judicial divorce often "acts like an employee of a bankrupt firm who
has lost all confidence in his principals and no longer therefore feels
any pleasure in his work. Thus the child in such circumstances stops
work - that is, his normal development is checked and he reacts
to the abnormal situation in some abnormal way. 13 Consequently,
10. L. PINCUS, Relationships and the Growth of Personality in MARRIAGE: STUDIES IN EMO-
TIONAL CONFLICT AND GROWTH 17 (L. Pincus ed. 1955).
11. JOINT COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH OF CHILDREN, CRISIS IN CHILD MENTAL HEALTH:
CHALLENGE FOR THE 1970's 169-70 (1969); R. BLOOD, THE FAMLY 597-615 (1972); M. BRECKEN-
RIDGE & M. MURPHY, GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE YOUNG CHILD 40-44 (1969); M. MAHLER
& R. RABINOVrrCH, The Effects of Marital Conflict on Child Development in NEUROTIC INTER-
ACTION IN MARRIAGE 44-56 (V. Eisenstein ed. 1956); Sugar, Divorce and Children, 63 SOUTHERN
MED. J. 1458 (1970). Such a disruption may materially heighten the possibility of delin-
quency. C. BURT, THE YOUNG DELINQUENT 90-92 (1938); S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, DELINQUENTS
IN THE MAKING 196-99 (1952); W. HEALY & A. BRONNER, NEW LIGHT ON DELINQUENCY AND ITS
TREATMENT 78-91 (1936).
12. L. DESPERT, CHILDREN OF DIVORCE 9-10 (1953). See also W. GOODE, AF=ER DIVORCE
(1956); Bernstein & Robey, The Detection and Management of Pediatric Difficulties Created
by Divorce, 30 PEDIATRICS 950 (1962); Lehrman, Psychopathological Aspects of Emotional
Divorce, 26 PSYCHOANALYTIC REV. 1 (1939); McDermott, Divorce and Its Psychiatric Sequelae
in Children, 23 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT. 421 (1970); McDermott, Parental Divorce in Early
Childhood, 124 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 118 (1968).
13. A. FREUD, INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOANALYSIS FOR TEACHERS 36 (1949).
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society must be concerned with the described emotional trauma
inflicted upon not only the child of divorce, but also upon the child
involved in either adoption or neglect and dependency proceedings.
Dr. Anna Freud has pointed to the danger to society from a failure
to compensate for custodial shortcomings:
Increased frustrations. . . arising for instance from unloving, forbid-
ding, rejecting attitudes of the parents abnormally increase the
child's aggressive reaction to the normal and inevitable depriva-
tions. . . .The lack of steady love-relationships in early childhood
caused either by internal or external factors . . . gives rise to states
of emotional starvation . . . and aggression manifests itself as pure,
independent destructiveness."
It is this sort of negative implication from a poor custody decision
that provides the reason for Judge Botein's agony.'5
H. BACKGROUND
A. Social History
There are some sound historical and social reasons for the late
development of the law in this field. The most pervasive explanation
is the changing role of the family in most cultures and the almost
revolutionary shift in its structure in developed and developing so-
cieties. The Industrial Revolution of the 19th century accelerated
acutely the transition of the family from a broader structure to the
husband - wife - children unit that we recognize today as the
nuclear or immediate family. The family formerly encompassed a
kinship web that included the clan, the extended family or the joint
household.'6 Dr. Kingsley Davis has discussed the implications of
this transition:
14. A. Freud, Notes on Aggression in J. GOLDSTEIN & J. KATZ, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW
983 (1965). Durbin and Bowlby have similarly pointed out the following:
Two points need to be emphasized therefore in considering the development of
cooperation in humans; first that it is a natural process like growth, and will proceed
spontaneously in a good environment; and secondly, that it can only develop satisfac-
torily when conditions are favourable. Anything which leads to distrust and fear of
others will interfere. . . .E. DURBIN & J. BowLBY, PERSONAL AGGRESSIVENESS AND WAR
59-62 (1939).
15. See note 2 supra.
16. See Cavan, supra note 4, at 419; W. GOODE, WORLD REVOLUTION AND FAMILy PAT ERNS
(paperback ed. 1970); Davis, Sociological and Statistical Analysis, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
[Vol. 8:151
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Theoretically the problem of the post-divorce child is univer-
sal-not only because divorce itself in one form or another is univer-
sal, but more profoundly because the child of divorce constitutes a
potentially anomalous element in social organization. In most socie-
ties this potentiality is not allowed to express itself; instead, social
institutions exist which take care of the child without undue turmoil.
The peoples of Western civilization, on the other hand, have devel-
oped a peculiar institutional system that makes the problem very
acute and hard to solve in practice. To understand why this is true
one must compare the position of the child after divorce in different
societies.
Although the immediate family is a universal group, it is not in-
stinctive; rather it is a cultural phenomenon . . . . It happens that
in countless societies the immediate family is so interwoven with
other institutional groups that, in case of divorce, the children do not
constitute a social problem. The break-up of the immediate family
is the same as in our society, and the anomaly of the child's position
is potentially the same, but actually the parents' relation to other
persons-often to clansmen and joint householders-is such that the
child continues largely under their care.1 7
Dr. Davis' 1944 article pointed to the development of the nu-
clear or immediate family with its minimal "emphasis on extended
kinship, with equalitarian rights of the parents in the child, and
with intense emotional involvement in both the marital and the
parental relationship" as creating a relatively new and unsolved
social problem that must somehow be met "by the creation of new
institutional relationships that will replace the kinship bonds of
primitive and archaic sobieties."' ' Almost three decades later we are
still grasping for a solution to this problem.
B. Legal History
Adoption has more ancient origins than do the legal concepts of
700 (1944); Gales, Marriage and the Family: Chinese Law, 6 J. FAm. L. 36 (1966); Hays &
Mindel, Extended Kinship Relations in Black and White Families, 35 J. MARR. & FAm. 51
(1973); Lemkin, Orphans of Living Parents: A Comparative Legal and Sociological View, 10
LAW & CONTMP. PROB. 834 (1944).
17. Davis, supra note 16, at 700-01. See also Note, Alternatives to "Parental Right" in
Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151 (1963).
18. Davis, supra note 16, at 719-20.
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marital custody or neglect and dependency.19 Despite its earlier ori-
gins it was not until Roman Law that the adoption process was
initially formalized by a judicial proceeding,"0 and the adoption law
of Rome has been absorbed into the legal fabric of civil law countries
like France, Germany and Spain.2' The common law of England did
not provide for adoptions, however, and it was not until 1926 that
Parliament enacted an adoption law.22 Adoption first entered this
country through the early civil law codes of Louisiana and Texas
but, like Rome, the institution was principally concerned with in-
heritance rights and not with the protection of the adoptee.?I Social-
conscience adoption, or that based primarily on the welfare of the
child, is an American development which originated in Massachu-
setts in 1851.2 The Massachusetts example was followed by other
states, but it was not until forty years later that Michigan required
a judge to make an investigation before entering a decree. In 1917
Minnesota enacted a more comprehensive law requiring an investi-
gation, control of both private placement and agency adoptions, a
social investigation prior to adjudication, and a trial custody period
prior to entry of a final decree. Similar laws have been enacted in
most states.25
The modern law regarding child custody took longer to develop.
Roman private law developed a quasi-legal doctrine of patria potes-
tas which gave recognition to the absolute power of a father to the
custody and control of his children.2" This doctrine carried over into
19. See, e.g., ExoDus 2:10; CODE OF HAMMURABI §§ 183, 185, quoted in Inker, The Adoption
of Baby Lenore: Two Interpretations of a Child's Best Interests, 11 J. FAM. L. 285 (1971).
20. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 602 (1968) [hereinafter cited as CLARK ]; Brosnan, The
Law of Adoption, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 332 (1922); Huard, Law of Adoption: Ancient and
Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743 (1956); Infausto, Perspective on Adoption, 383 ANNALS 1 (1969);
Simpson, The Unfit Parent: Conditions Under Which a Child May Be Adopted Without the
Consent of His Parent, 39 U. DET. L.J. 347, 349 (1962).
21. See note 20 supra.
22. The Adoption of Children Act of 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 29; 17 HALSBURY, LAWS OF
ENGLAND §§ 1406-23 (2d ed. 1935).
23. Infausto, supra note 20, at 3-4. An excellent survey on the history of adoption in the
United States may be found in Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law of
Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443 (1971).
24. See Presser, supra note 23, at 443; H. WITMER, INDEPENDENT ADOPIONS 20-30 (1963).
25. Infausto, supra note 20, at 7.
26. Patria potestas was the Roman law concept of "paternal authority" or "paternal
power" (BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1283 (4th ed. 1951)). See also Inker & Perretta, A Child's
Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, 5 FAM. L.Q. 108, 109 (1971).
[Vol. 8:151
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English law and endured until about the fourteenth century.2" In
feudal England custody was merely an incident of the guardianship
of lands, and it only gradually came to be regarded as involving any
responsibility toward the child. 2 The courts of equity later assumed
jurisdiction over the welfare of children under the developing doc-
trine of parens patriae29 which was founded on the theory that the
crown should protect all those who have no other protector. This
idea crystallized by the seventeenth century. Furthermore, patria
potestas crept back conceptually into this scheme, the father be-
coming regarded as a natural guardian whose unfitness was practi-
cally impossible to establish." This common law preference for the
father carried over into American law, and in most jurisdictions it
has only been abrogated by statute. It was not until 1925 that the
English Guardianship of Infants Act3' equalized the parents' right
to custody although the deterioration of paternal preference began
earlier in the United States. Today the laws of most states provide
that there will be no preference for either parent in a custody con-
test, but, as a practical matter, most adjudications favor the
mother.32
Like adoption and child custody, the modern concepts of abuse,
neglect and dependency were very late in developing. The strength
of the father's claim to ultimate decision-making with regard to the
care and control of his children and the difficulty in rebutting what
27. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 435 (2d ed. 1898).
28. Foster & Freed, Child Custody (Part I), 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 423 (1964); CLARK at 572;
Eyre v. Shaftesbury, 2 P. Wms. 102, 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (1722).
29. Parens patriae was an English common law concept meaning "father of his country;
parent of the country. . .referring to the sovereign power of guardianship over persons under
disability." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (4th ed. 1951).
30. Foster & Freed, supra note 28, at 424; Inker & Perretta, supra note 26, at 109-10;
Weinman, The Trial Judge Awards Custody, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 721-23 (1944); 1 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *452; 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 511-13 (3d ed.
1927); Comment, 36 S. CAL. L. REv. 255 (1963). The poet Percy Shelley is supposed to have
been one of the earliest exceptions to this almost unimpeachable rule when Lord Eldon
refused to give him custody of his children because of his "vicious and immoral" atheistic
beliefs. Shelley v. Westbrooke, 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (Ch. 1817). See also Comment, The Custody
of Children, 2 IND. L.J. 325 (1927).
31. Guardianship of Infants Act, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 45 (1925). There was a gradual change
in English law prior to that time as earlier Acts gave the Court of Chancery the authority to
award custody of children under seven, and later under sixteen, to the mother. Talfourd's
Act, 2 & 3 Vict., c. 54 (1839); Infants Custody Act, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 12 (1873).
32. Drinan, The Rights of Children in Modern American Family Law, 2 J. FAm. L. 101,
102 (1962); Comment, 36 S. Cal. L. Rev. 255, 257-58 (1963).
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amounted, in practical terms, to a presumption in favor of the rea-
sonableness of that role as exercised by the father has previously
been discussed.3 Historically, actual physical abuse was primarily
the concern of the criminal courts subject to the leeway given the
parent to use "due moderation" in the disciplining of the child.3
Neglect law is principally statutory in origin, but a common law rule
developed in the absence of statute that a parent had the obligation
to provide food, shelter or clothing within their ability to so provide,
and the death of a child resulting from a dereliction of such duty
could be manslaughter or, if willful, murder.3 Early laws were de-
veloped, however, dealing with orphaned, abandoned, dependent
and neglected children, and the law progressed from the almshouse,
through apprenticeship and orphan asylums, to placement of the
children in foster homes or placement through adoption.36 A star-
tling example of the inadequacies of the law in dealing with such
children a century ago is the classic story of the child Mary Ellen
who was discovered in a tenement building suffering from malnutri-
tion and daily beatings. The church worker who found her sought
to have the child removed. Unsuccessful, she finally turned in des-
peration to the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals for
assistance on the theory that Mary Ellen was a member of the
33. See text accompanying notes 26-32 supra.
34. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Hinkle v. State, 127 Ind. 490, 26
N.E. 777 (1891); State v. Fischer, 245 Iowa 170, 60 N.W.2d 105 (1953); State v. Washington,
104 La. 443, 29 So. 55 (1901); People v. Green, 155 Mich. 524, 119 N.W. 1087 (1909); State v.
Koonse, 123 Mo. App. 655, 101 S.W. 139 (1907); Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 95 N.W. 640
(1903); Richardson v. State Board, 98 N.J.L. 690, 121 A. 457 (1923); State v. Liggett, 84 Ohio
App. 225, 83 N.E.2d 663 (1948); Stanfield v. State, 43 Tex. 167 (1875); Carpenter v. Common-
wealth, 186 Va. 851, 44 S.E.2d 419 (1947); State v. McDonie, 89 W.Va. 185, 109 S.E. 710
(1921); Steber v. Norris, 188 Wis. 366, 206 N.W. 173 (1925); State v. Spiegel, 39 Wyo. 309,
270 P. 1064 (1928); PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 878-80 (1957); Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 396 (1963). In
a minority of jurisdictions the parent was deemed to be the sole arbiter as to the reasonable-
ness of the degree of punishment, and all punishment was per se reasonable that did not result
in disfigurement or permanent injury, or was not inflicted maliciously. Nicholas v. State, 32
Ala. App. 574, 28 So. 2d 422 (1946); Dean v. State, 89 Ala. 46, 8 So. 38 (1889); Boyd v. State,
88 Ala. 169, 7 So. 268 (1889); State v. Jones, 95 N.C. 588, 59 Am. Rep. 282 (1886).
35. Biddle v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 14, 141 S.E.2d 710 (1965); 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE § 297 (1957); Shepherd, The Abused Child and the Law, 22 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 182, 184-86 (1965).
36. Paulsen, Juvenile Courts, Family Courts and the Poor Man, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 694, 699
(1966); Presser, supra note 20, at 351-52. The adoption laws resulted largely from the inability
of society to deal effectively with these children in 19th century institutional settings. Nugent
v. Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 33 P. 23 (1893).
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animal kingdom and that the laws regarding cruelty to animals were
applicable .3 Today the law of abuse, neglect and dependency is a
creature of statute and is a part of the juvenile or welfare law of
every state.Y
C. Present State of the Law
1. Divorce Custody
Despite the considerable flux in divorce law there are some gen-
eral postulates that may be made about the state of divorce custody
law at the present time. Most custody determinations in divorce
proceedings are consensual and incidental to the resolution of the
marital conflict,3 1 but if a contest develops an adjudication must be
made by a judge who exercises his discretion with the aid of few
statutory guidelines." The harsh common law rule awarding the
father unlimited rights to the child has been replaced by a prefer-
ence for the mother, but both rules have ostensibly been abrogated
by statute or judicial decisions, although in practice the mother
still usually prevails over the father, especially when the child is of
tender years.4 Somewhat at war with those earlier and vestigial
concepts is the "best interest of the child" doctrine as early articu-
lated by Judge Cardozo:
The chancellor in exercising his jurisdiction upon petition does not
proceed upon the theory that the petitioner, whether father or
mother, has a cause of action against the other or indeed against any
one. He acts as parens patriae to do what is best for the interest of
the child. He is to put himself in the position of a 'wise, affectionate,
and careful parent' . . . and make provision for the child according-
ly. . . . He is not determining rights 'as between a parent and a
37. FONTANA, THE MALTREATED CHILD: THE MALTREATMENT SYNDROME IN CHILDREN 8-9
(1964).
38. CLARK at 581-82.
39. Goode, supra note 12, at 311-13; R. LEvY, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION:
A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 223-24 (1969). There may often be a custody decree, but its terms
are predicated on a more or less pro forma judicial confirmation of a pre-existing agreement
between the parties.
40. Texas, however, allows a jury to determine custody. See Levy, supra note 39, at 222.
See also Oster, Custody Proceedings: A Study of Vague and Indefinite Standards, 5 J. FAM.
L. 21, 23-25 (1965).
41. Foster & Freed, supra note 28, at 425. See also C. FOOTE, R. LEvY & F. SANDER, FAMILY
LAW 851 (1966).
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child,' or as between one parent and another. . . . Equity does not
concern itself with such disputes in their relation to the disputants.
Its concern is for the child.2
Most courts subscribe to the "best interest" test in all child cus-
tody cases, but at best the rule is applied in a modified form.43 In
many jurisdictions this mutation results from the infusion of a par-
ental fitness test where the custody contest is between a parent and
a nonparent.44 The contrary view was stated almost a century ago
by Judge Brewer, later a Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, in the case of Chapsky v. Wood:
It is an obvious fact, that ties of blood weaken, and ties of companion-
ship strengthen, by lapse of time; and the prosperity and welfare of
the child depend on the number and strength of these ties, as well as
on the ability to do all which the promptings of these ties com-
pel. . . . The right of the father must be considered; the right of the
one who has filled the parental place for years should be consid-
ered. . . . Above all things, the paramount consideration is, what
will promote the welfare of the child?45
The deviations from the "best interest" rule in an intraparental
custody proceeding stem from the traditional preference for the
mother and the concept of fault which still dominates divorce ac-
tions.46 Where the contest is between a parent and a "stranger,"
42. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925). Many states incorporate this
test in their statutes and require its application in custody disputes. Leavell, Custody Dis-
putes and the Proposed Model Act, 2 GA. L. Rsv. 162, 163 (1968).
43. Foster & Freed, supra note 28, at 425.
44. See, e.g., People ex rel Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 104 N.E.2d 895 (1952). In
some states the nonparent is faced with an almost insurmountable burden of proof which may
even treat the parental rights as almost absolute. In Raymond v. Cotner, 175 Neb. 158, 120
N.W.2d 892 (1963), a majority of the court held that a natural parent has an absolute right
to custody unless that right is forfeited due to unfitness. The dissent advocated the "best
interest" test. See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), where the Supreme Court
held that the parent's right to instruct his child is an inherent natural right entitled to the
protection of the due process clause. See Ernst v. Flynn, 373 Mich. 337, 129 N.W.2d 430
(1964).
45. 26 Kan. 650, 653-54, 40 Am. R. 321, 333 (1881). Other early cases expressing a primary
concern for the well-being of the child are United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 30 (No. 15256)
(C.C.D.R.I. 1824); Brinster v. Compton, 68 Ala. 299 (1880); Sheers v. Stein, 75 Wis. 44, 43
N.W. 728 (1889).
46. Podell, Peck & First, Custody-To Which Parent?, 56 MARQ. L. REv. 51, 66-67 (1972);
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however, there is still a frequent use of a residual property concept
in the parental right doctrine." The "property" language is seldom
used now but the same idea is expressed in natural law terms, or
by a bare reference to "the parent's right to custody."48 Neverthe-
less, the "best interest" doctrine stands as the polestar for enlight-
ened custody adjudications.
2. Adoption Custody
Adoption proceedings are purely statutory, and as procedure and
substance are often indistinguishable in this area, general rules are
difficult to state. Professor Foster has stated that "the 'rules of
thumb': (1) parental fitness, and (2) best interests of the child,
constitute the black letter law of custody" in adoption.49 There are
two approaches to the initiation of an adoption. One, utilized by the
Children's Bureau of the U.S. Department of Health, Education
and Welfare, provides for the termination of pre-existing custodial
rights in separate procedures," and the second terminates existing
rights and establishes new ones in the same proceeding. 5' In either
case the adoption is initiated by a petition, but the primary rele-
Comment, Child Custody: Considerations in Granting the Award Between Adversely Claim-
ing Parents, 36 S. CAL. L. REv. 255, 261 (1963); Comment, Alimony, Property Settlement and
Child Custody Under the New Divorce Statutes: No-fault is Not Enough, 22 CATH. U. L. REv.
365, 378 (1973). At one time this was the general rule and especially where the ground for
the divorce was adultery. Parker v. Parker, 222 Md. 69, 158 A.2d 607 (1960); Beck v. Beck,
175 Neb. 108, 120 N.W.2d 585 (1963); Owens v. Owens, 96 Va. 191, 15 S.E. 72 (1898);
Regenvetter v. Regenvetter, 124 Wash. 173, 213 P. 917 (1923); SELECTED ESSAYS ON FA~mrY
LAW 612, 613 (1950); 1 VERNIER, AhEIRCAN FAMILY LAw § 54, p. 274 (1961).
47. See Leavell, supra note 42, at 164. See also Shea v. Shea, 100 Cal. App. 2d 60, 223 P.2d
32, 34 (1950) (court stated that "California has, in effect, adopted the harsh rule that the right
of a fit and proper parent to have the custody of his child is somewhat in the nature of a
property right. . . ."); Kennedy v. Meara, 127 Ga. 68, 56 S.E. 243, 247 (1906) (court said
that "the parent cannot be deprived of his property right in the labor and services of the minor
child, except by due process of law.") See Comment, Custody of Children: Best Interest of
Child vs. Rights of Parents, 33 CALIF. L. REv. 306 (1945).
48. tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Pres-
ent Status, 16 STAN. L. REV. 900, 921-27 (1964). See Raymond v. Cotner, supra note 45;
Whiteman v. Robinson, 145 W.Va. 685, 116 S.E.2d 691 (1960).
49. Foster, supra note 1, at 2-3.
50. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, LEGIsLATIvE GUIDES FOR THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE ADOPTION OF CHILDREN 9, 37 (Children's Bureau Publication No. 394-
1961) [This Act is hereinafter cited as CHImDREN's BUREAU TERMINATION Acr and is set forth
in the Appendix]. See also Katz, Community Decision-Makers and the Promotion of Values
in the Adoption of Children, 4 J. FAx. L. 7 (1964).
51. CLARK at 613, 615.
1974]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
vance of the two approaches is in the notice requirements and the
procedure at the hearing.2 The petition is usually required to be
signed and verified by the adoptive parents, and, in some states, the
names of the natural parents must be given in the petition. 3 In
many states the adoptive parents must have had the child residing
with them for a certain period of time54 before the initiation of the
petition, and, in most states, notice of the petition must be given
to the prior custodian and/or the natural parents. 5 The second stage
is the normally informal hearing, at which the petitioner, or peti-
tioners, has the burden of proof."
Perhaps the most crucial procedural stage from the standpoint of
the child is the agency investigation which is either allowed or re-
quired in almost all states. 7 At this point in the adoption, the judge
refers the petition to a public or licensed private adoption agency
for an investigation and report. In some states the court then enters
an interlocutory decree with a final decree to be entered after a trial
period, most commonly six months. 8 The interlocutory decree may
be revoked for cause,55 but the final decree has the status and pre-
sumed validity of any other judgment." However, it is at this point
that most litigation occurs through the attempted revocation of con-
sent by the natural parent or prior custodian or an attack on the
52. Id. at 611-15.
53. Id. at 615.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 611-14. The notice requirement is complex, and the complexity has been height-
ened by the recent Supreme Court decision in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), which
requires notice to the putative father of an illegitimate child, or at least an effort to give notice
which comports with due process. See Hession, Adoptions After "Stanley"-Rights for Fa-
thers of Illegitimate Children, 61 ILL. B. J. 350 (1973); Note, 21 DEPAUL L. REv. 1036 (1972);
Comment, The Emerging Constitutional Protection of the Putative Father's Parental Rights,
70 MICH. L. REv. 1581 (1972); Note, Stanley v. Illinois: Expanding the Rights of the Unwed
Father, 34 U. PiTr. L. REv. 303 (1972); Comment, The Strange Boundaries of Stanley: Provid-
ing Notice of Adoption to the Unknown Putative Father, 59 VA. L. REV. 517 (1973). See also
In re Brennan, 270 Minn. 455, 134 N.W.2d 126 (1965); State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social
Services, 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970), vacated and remanded sub nom. Rothstein
v. Lutheran Social Services, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
56. CLARK at 615-16.
57. Id. at 616-19.
58. Id. at 619-20.
59. Newton v. Wilson, 199 Va. 864, 102 S.E.2d 299 (1958).
60. Wilson v. Anderson, 232 N.C. 212, 59 S.E.2d 836 (1950), rehearing denied, 232 N.C.
521, 61 S.E.2d 447 (1950); Whitley v. Reeves, 39 Tenn. App. 169, 281 S.W.2d 411 (1955);
Magevney v. Karsch, 167 Tenn. 32, 65 S.W.2d 562 (1933).
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decree by the parents. 1 Other points of serious conflict arise in the
-situation where foster parents seek to adopt a child entrusted to
them by an agency, andwhere pre-existing custodial rights are
terminated involuntarily because of unfitness.2
3. Abuse, Neglect and Dependency
Custody decrees resulting from a judicial determination that a
child has been abused, neglected or is dependent are usually adop-
tion decrees entered after the prior parental or custodial rights have
been terminated.63 These termination procedures are wholly statu-
tory and vary considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, al-
though there is a trend toward enactment of a specific termination
statute.4
It is difficult to state a dogmatic rule as to where child neglect
begins and ends. Each case must stand on its own facts, but "neg-
lect" generally contemplates a failure to exercise the care demanded
by the circumstances. It embraces wilful as well as negligent disre-
gard of a legal duty, and its meaning changes in response to change
in surrounding circumstances. Neglect may encompass not only a
failure to provide for the physical needs of a child commensurate
with the material ability of the custodian, but it may also involve a
denial of affection, guidance or consideration. A "dependent" child,
in the usual statutory sense, is a normal child whose support comes
from a source other than the natural guardian and the concept need
not encompass the extreme example of abandonment. 5
Missouri has enacted a statute which is somewhat typical of the
newer laws in establishing a jurisdictional base. It provides for ter-
mination of parental rights where:
61. CLARK at 620-29, 666-71; Note, Revocation of Parental Consent to Adoption: Legal
Doctrine and Social Policy, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 564 (1961); Note, Attacks on Adoption Decrees
by Natural Parents to Regain Custody, 61 YALm L. J. 591 (1952). See also In Re Krueser, 104
Ariz. 26, 448 P.2d 82 (1968).
62. CLARK at 629-38; Foster, supra note 1; Katz, Foster Parents Versus Agencies: A Case
Study in the Judicial Application of "The Best Interests of the Child" Doctrine, 65 MiCH. L.
Rv. 145 (1966); Simpson, supra note 20.
63. CLARK at 629; Simpson, supra note 20.
64. Note, Legislative and Judicial Recognition of the Distinction between Custody and
Termination Orders in Child Neglect Cases, 7 J. FAM. L. 66, 67 (1967).
65. 47 Am. JuR. 2d Juvenile Courts and Delinquent Children § 24 (1969).
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[I]t appears by clear, cogent and convincing evidence-that for one
year or more immediately prior to the filing of the petition (a) the
parents have abandoned the child; (b) the parents have willfully,
substantially and continuously or repeatedly neglected the child and
refused to give the child necessary care and protection; (c) the par-
ents, being financially able, have willfully neglected to provide the
child with the necessary substance, education or other care necessary
for his health, morals or welfare . . . ; (d) the parents are unfit by
reason of debauchery, habitual use of intoxicating liquor or narcotic
drugs or repeated lewd and lascivious behavior, which conduct is
found by the court to be seriously detrimental to the health, morals
or wellbeing of the child; (e) the parents have been found incompe-
tent. 66
Neglect, of course, is difficult to judicially determine."7 In recent
years there has been a tendency to stress the provision of protective
services to children within their family in neglect situations and
avoid termination unless other alternatives fail.6 8 The law has at-
tempted to deal more directly with abuse as represented by batter-
ing than with neglect. 9 The areas of abuse, neglect and dependency
are probably among the most fertile fields for statutory revision.
66. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.441.1 (2).
67. Dean Monrad Paulsen has pointed to one of the greatest difficulties:
What one regards as proper care may, indeed, be a matter of dispute reflecting class
and cultural differences. Standards of child rearing adequate in one cultural setting
may appear appalling in another. Paulsen, supra note 36, at 699.
S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL 22-89 (1971); M. MIDONICK, CHILDREN, PARENTS AND THE COURTS:
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, UNGOVERNABILITY AND NEGLECT 11-13 (1972); H. RIESE, HEAL THE HUT
CHILD (1962); Chevigny, Safeguarding Legal Rights in Providing Protective Services, 13
CHILDREN 870 (1966); Young, The Problem of Neglect-The Legal Aspects, 4 J. FAM. L. 29
(1964).
68. T. BECKER, CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES AND THE LAW (1969); CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF
AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES (1960); S. JENKINS & M. SAUBER, PATHS
TO CHILD PLACEMENT 140-58 (1966); R. MULFORD, V. WYLEGALA & E. MELSON, CASEWORKER AND
JUDGE IN NEGLECT CASES (1956); Bishop, Helping Neglectful Parents, 355 ANNALS 82 (1964);
Sandusky, Services to Neglected Children, 7 CHILDREN 23 (1960).
69. See D. BAKAN, SLAUGHTER OF THE INNOCENTS (1971); D. GIL, VIOLENCE AGAINST
CHILDREN: PHYSICAL CHILD ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES (1970); R. HELFER & C. KEMPE, THE.
BATTERED CHILD (1968); C. KEMPE & R. HELFER, HELPING THE BATTERED CHILD AND HIS FAMILY
(1972); L. YOUNG, WEDNESDAY'S CHILDREN (1964); Daly, Willful Child Abuse and State Re-
porting Statutes, 23 MIAMI L. REv. 283 (1969); Paulsen, The Legal Framework for Child
Protection, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1966); Paulsen, Parker & Adelman, ChildAbuse Reporting
Laws-Some Legislative History, 34 GRo. WASH. L. REV. 482 (1966); Shepherd, supra note
35.
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III. LAW REFORM
Despite the neglect of many years, there has been almost a sun-
burst of legislative proposals within the last decade. Public opinion
has apparently coalesced with efforts to reform the divorce laws in
the several states, and the child custody provisions have tagged
along with these reform efforts. Instead of discussing each of these
proposals separately, this paper will attempt to briefly discuss the
various stages of the custody process and will refer to the reform
suggestions within the context of each stage.
A. Adjudicatory Processes
1. Initiation of Proceedings
Divorce custody proceedings are customarily initiated by the fil-
ing of the initial pleading in the divorce proceeding. The Revised
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act provides that the initial petition
must contain "the names, ages, and addresses of all living children
of the marriage, and whether the wife is pregnant," and the Act
further requires the pleading to recite "any arrangements as to sup-
port, custody, and visitation of the children. ... 10 The Divorce
Reform Act requires essentially the same recitation in the initial
pleading, therein referred to as a "libel.""
70. REVISED UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 303(b) 4 and 5 [hereinafter cited as
REV. UMDA]. The ABA Family Law Section's PROPOSED REVISED UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE Acr agrees with this approach as it incorporates § 303 (b)(4) in toto and its § 303
(b) (6) changes § 303 (b) (6) in the REv. UMDA only slightly with no real difference in sub-
stance. The UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Aar was promulgated in 1970 and the Act was
revised a year later (the relevant sections of the Revised Act are included in the Appendix to
this article). The Revised Act was submitted to the ABA House of Delegates in February,
1972, but it did not receive the endorsement of that body because of the opposition of the
Family Law Section. The Section's Council thereafter approved and recommended the
PROPOSED REVISED UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT [hereinafter cited as PROP. REv.
UMDA]. The pertinent portions of that proposal which differ from the corresponding sections
of the REv. UMDA are included in the Appendix. See Proposed Revised Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act, 7 FAM. L.Q. 135 (1973); Podell, The Case for Revision of the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act, 7 FAM. L.Q. 169 (1973) reprinted from 18 S.D.L. REv. 601 (1973).
See also Callow, Custody of the Child and the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 18 S.D.
L. Rv. 551 (1973); Foster, Divorce Reform and the Uniform Act, 18 S.D.L. REv. 572, 590
(1973); Levy, Introduction to Symposium on the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 18 S.D.
L. REv. 531 (1973). Judge Podell, Chairman of the ABA Family Law Section, indicated that
the ABA House of Delegates would act on the proposed revisions at its August, 1973, meeting,
but action was deferred at that time. See 42 U.S.L.W. 2099 (August 14, 1973).
71. A Divorce Reform Act, 5 HARV. J. LEGIS. 563, 582 (1968) (especially § 201 (a)(1) of that
Act).
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In an adpjtion a petition generally starts the proceeding. The
Revised Uniform Adoption Act requires that certain specified infor-
mation be set forth therein and that notice be given to the agency,
the public welfare department and any agency or person whose
consent is required but who has not consented. 2 The Children's
Bureau Act for the Adoption of Children contains similar petition
entries and requires notice to be served on the child placement
agency and on any agency responsible for making the requisite so-
cial study.7 3 In termination proceedings a petition is filed by any one
of a broad category of persons on certain grounds, with a specific
checklist of items to be set forth, and with notice given to the par-
ents of the child, the guardian of the person of the child,74 the person
who has legal custody of the child, any person in loco parentis to
the child, and the guardian ad litem of any party. 5
2. Representation for Child
Perhaps the most widespread movement in the developing law of
child custody has been the advocacy of legal representation for the
child.76 The Revised Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act provides
72. REVISED UNIFORM ADOPTION AcT §§ 9, 11. The UNIFORm ADOPTION ACr was originally
promulgated in 1953, and it was extensively revised in 1969 and further amended in 1971.
Section 9 was one of the sections amended at that time.
73. See AN ACT FOR THE ADOPTION OF CHILDREN §§ 7, 11 contained in CHILDREN's BUREAU,
LEGISLATIE GUIDE FOR THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE
ADOPTION OF CHILDREN, supra note 50 [this Act is hereinafter cited as CHILDREN'S BUREAU
ADOPTION AcT and is set forth in the Appendix]. This Act does not require notice to other
parties as the termination of pre-existing parental or custodial rights takes place in an earlier
and separate proceeding.
74. One important and highly desirable feature of the two Children's Bureau Acts is the
definition section (Section 2) which clearly defines the important terms and establishes the
concept of "guardianship of the person." See also Fraser, Guardianship of the Person, 45 IOWA
L. REv. 239 (1960); Paulsen & Best, Appointment of a Guardian in the Conflict of Laws, 45
IowA L. REV. 212 (1960); Weissman, Guardianship: Every Child's Right, 355 ANNALS 134
(1964).
75. See CHILDREN'S BUREAU TERMINATION AcT at §§ 4-6. Some solution must be found to
the dilemma posed by Stanley v. Illinois, supra note 55, regarding notice to the putative
father of an illegitimate child. One approach has been to require the putative father to file a
notice of intent to claim paternity prior to the birth of the child with the appropirate probate
court in order to have any subsequent standing. See MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.3(a)
(Supp. 1972).
Another approach where either the father or his whereabouts are unknown would be to
appoint a guardian ad litem for him charged with the responsibility of trying to locate the
father and reporting his whereabouts to the court. This would be far preferable to utilizing
order of publication as the Supreme Court suggested in Stanley.
76. Coyne, Who Will Speak for the Child?, 383 ANNAL 34 (1969); Edelstein, The Law
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that "the court may appoint an attorney to represent the interests
of a minor or dependent child."77 The Proposed Revised Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act states that "the court shall appoint an
attorney .. ,"78 The Revised Uniform Adoption Act makes no spe-
cific reference to the appointment of counsel for the child although
the Children's Bureau Act provides that the "court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for such person as may be deemed necessary or
desirable."79 The Act for the Termination of the Parent-Child Rela-
tionship provides for power in the court to appoint a guardian ad
litem for any "party" including the child."0
Although the mandatory appointment of counsel for the child in
all custody proceedings is highly desirable and preferred, an equally
crucial issue is posed by the question of the role that the attorney
should play - is he a guardian ad litem in the traditional sense, or
is he an advocate?" Actually, the role is, and should be, mixed
Guardian in the New York Family Court, 24 Juv. JuSTICE 14 (1973); Hansen, The Role and
Rights of Children in Divorce Actions, 6 J. FAM. L. 1 (1966); Inker & Perretta, supra note 26;
Isaacs, The Role of the Lawyer in Representing Minors in the New Family Court, 12 BuFF.
L. REV. 501 (1963); Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and the
State, 4 FAm. L.Q. 319 (1970); Pokorny, Observations by a "Friend of the Court, " 10 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 778 (1944). See also Barth v. Barth, 39 Ohio Op. 2d 83, 225 N.E.2d 866 (1967);
Zinni v. Zinni 103 R.I. 417, 238 A.2d 373 (1968); Wendland v. Wendland, 29 Wis. 2d 145,
138 N.W.2d 185 (1965). There is an interesting dissenting opinion by Circuit Judge Rives in
the case of Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012, 1025-26 (5th Cir. 1969), wherein he equated a
child custody hearing to a habeas corpus proceeding and argued that there should be a right
to a transcript of the former equal to the right for one in the latter for purposes of appeal.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has recently held that due process required the ap-
pointment of counsel for indigent parents at a hearing for the termination of parental rights
on the ground of unfitness. Danforth v. State Dept. of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794
(Maine 1973).
77. REv. UMDA § 310 (emphasis supplied).
78. PROP. REv. UMDA § 310 (emphasis supplied). The DIVORCE REFORM ACT, note 71
supra, requires in § 201(b) that a lawyer must be appointed for minor children, and it further
provides in § 201 (c) that the children "shall be treated as parties to the divorce proceed-
in g . ...."
79. CHILDREN'S BUREAU ADOPTION ACr § 14.
80. CHILDREN'S BUREAU TERMINATION ACr § § 2m, 6, 8.
81. Children's Bureau, The Attorney's Part in Adoption (Children's Bureau Folder No. 47-
1959); Fain, The Role and Responsibility of the Lawyer in Custody Cases, 1 FAM. L.Q., #3,
36 (1967); Gibbs, Practical Views of the Family Lawyer on the Subject of "Our Separate
Ways," 1 FAM. L.Q., #3, 3 (1967); Isaacs, supra note 6; Isaacs, supra note 76; Katz, supra
note 5; Katz & Segal, The Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court Proceedings: A Non-Polar
Approach, 61 GEO. L.J. 1401 (1973); Phillips, Mental Hygiene, Divorce and the Law, 3 J. FAM.
L. 63 (1963); Polow, The Lawyer in the Adoption Process, 6 FAM. L.Q. 72 (1972); Speca &
Wehrman, Protecting the Rights of Children in Divorce Cases in Missouri, 38 U. Mo. (KC)
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depending on the facts and situation in a given case. However, a
more important question arises with regard to the type of training
the law student should receive to prepare him for the socio-legal role
he must increasingly assume in the juvenile courts.82
3. Role of Judge and Court Organization
The judicial role in custody proceedings is central and of particu-
lar significance because of the wide discretion reposed in the judge
in such cases. The criteria utilized in selecting such judges, however,
differ little from those applied in the judicial selection process in
general. Dr. Andrew Watson has discussed this with concern and
has listed, among other problems, (1) the tendency of the judge to
moralize, 83 (2) the desire among judges to be completely correct in
their decisions, a desire that may result in "decision-making para-
lysis," (3) the failure of many juvenile or family court judges to
understand the behavioral sciences or have any familiarity with
child development or psychology concepts as expressed in the litera-
ture and (4) the pitfalls of judicial administration which may cause
a case to be rotated from docket to docket with a different judge
handling each stage of the proceeding."4
A comparable problem is created by judicial splintering, that is,
where a multitude of courts may deal with th6-problems of the
L. REV. 1 (1969); Treadwell, The Lawyer in Juvenile Court Dispositional Proceedings: Advo-
cate, Social Worker, or Otherwise, 16 Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 109 (1965); Watson, The Lawyer as
Counsellor, 5 J. FAM. L. 7 (1965).
82. Barnett, Emotional Problems Encountered in Divorce Cases-A Seminar, 3 J. FAM. L.
208 (1963); Bradway, The Legal Peg and the Social and Economic Hole, 10 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROB. 855 (1944); Fogelson, Pearson & Sander, Making Better Lawyers: A Report on a Unique
Interdisciplinary Venture, 2 FAM. L.Q. 322 (1968); Kahn-Freund, Observations on the Possi-
ble Cooperation of Teachers of Law and Teachers of Social Science in Family Law, 9 J. LEGAL
ED. 76 (1956); Levy, The Perilous Necessity: Nonlegal Materials in a Family Law Course, 15
J. LEGAL ED. 43 (1963); Skoler, Law School Curriculum Coverage of Juvenile and Family
Court Subjects, 5 J. FAM. L. 74 (1965); Treadwell, supra note 81; Watson, The Quest for
Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. Cmi. L. REv. 93
(1968); Zukerman, Cultivating Social Perspectives in the Lawyer, 5 J. FAM. L. 1 (1965).
83. In this regard see the almost unbelievable colloquy quoted in Katz, supra note 67, at
63-64.
84. Watson, Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYR. L.
REV. 55, 61-64 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Watson]. See also Bronson, Custody on Appeal,
10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 737 (1944); Wadlington, Portrait of the Judge as Popular Author:
An Appeal for Anonymity and Restraint in Domestic Relations Opinions, 1 FAM. L.Q., #4, 77
(1967); Watson, Family Law and Its Challenge for Psychiatry, 2 J. FAM. L. 71 (1962); Wein-
man, The Trial Judge Awards Custody, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 721 (1944).
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family. One court may handle juvenile delinquency problems, an-
other divorce and its custody adjudications, a third neglect and
dependency cases and yet a fourth adoptions. There must be a
greater effort to integrate these similar functions into a single judi-
cial setting - as in the Family Court - where all child custody
proceedings will be dealt with by a single court which is equipped
to entertain the complex legal questions involved. 5
4. Role of Social Services Personnel
Perhaps in no other court, and in no other type of case, is the role
of non-legal professional advice more crucial than in a child custody
case in the Juvenile or Family Court. The role of social workers and
psychiatric or psychological consultants and counselors is expand-
ing and rightly so. The Revised Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
provides for maximum utilization of such personnel, and the Pro-
posed Revised Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act agrees with these
provisions.8 The Revised Uniform Adoption Act also provides for an
investigation or investigations as do the Children's Bureau Acts.8
B. Decision-Making and Disposition
The "best interest of the child" test and the importance of its role
85. Children's Bureau, Legislative Guide for Drafting Family and Juvenile Court Acts
(Children's Bureau Publication No. 472-1969); Dembitz, Ferment and Experiment in New
York: Juvenile Cases in the New Family Court, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1963); Dyson & Dyson,
Family Courts in the United States, 8 J. FAM. L. 505 (1968) and 9 J. FAM. L. 1 (1969); Family
Courts: A Symposium, 27 TENN. L. REv. 357 (1960); Goldberg & Sheridan, Family Courts-
An Urgent Need, 8 J. PUBL. L. 537 (1959); Hansen, Three Dimensions of Divorce, 50 MARQ.
L. REv. 1 (1966); Kay, A Family Court: The California Proposal, 56 CALI. L. REV. 1205 (1968);
Kay & Phillips, Poverty and the Law of Child Custody, 54 CALI. L. REv. 717, 725 (1966);
Paulsen, The New York Family Court Act, 12 BUFF. L. REV. 420 (1963); Paulsen, supra note
36, at 698-706; Rubin, The Standard Family Court Act, 1 J. FAM. L. 105 (1961); The Standard
Family Court Act, 5 N.P.P.A.J. 99 (1959).
86. REV. UMDA § 404-05. See also R. Hansen & S. Goldberg, Casework in a Family
Court, in READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 328 (Allen, Ferster & Rubin ed. 1968).
87. REV. UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT §§ 11-13; CHILDREN'S BUREAU TERMINATION ACr § 7;
CHILDREN'S BUREAU ADOPTION ACr § 12. See also Benedek, Child Custody Laws: Their Psychi-
atric Implications, 129 Am. J. PSYCHAT. 102 (1972); Benedek & Benedek, New Child Custody
Laws: Making Them Do What They Say, 42 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIAT. 825 (1972); Foster &
Freed, Child Custody (Part II), 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 615 (1964); Katz, supra note 50; Plant,
The Psychiatrist Views Children of Divorced Parents, 10 LAW & CoNtEMP. PROB. 807 (1944);
Symposium on the Child and the Law: Custody, 10 KAN. L. REv. 555, 558 (1962); Watson,
supra note 84; Westman, The Psychiatrist and Child Custody Contest, 127 Ais. J. PSYCHIAT.
123 (1971).
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in custody adjudications have been discussed previously.88 As
pointed out, the test is quite subjective and difficulty often results
from that very subjectivity. California has codified guidelines rather
than allowing for an open-ended discretion:
In any proceeding where there is at issue the custody of a minor child,
the court may, during the pendency of the proceeding or at any time
thereafter, make such order for the custody of such child during his
minority as may seem necessary or proper. If a child is of sufficient
age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent preference as
to custody, the court shall consider and give due weight to his wishes
in making an award of custody or modification thereof. Custody
should be awarded in the following order of preference:
(a) To either parent according to the best interests of the child.
(b) To the person or persons in whose home the child has been
living in a wholesome and stable environment.
(c) To any other person or persons deemed by the court to be
suitable and able to provide adequate and proper care and guidance
for the child.
Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person or
persons other than a parent, without the consent of the parents, it
shall make a finding that an award of custody to a parent would be
detrimental to the child and the award to a nonparent is required to
serve the best interest of the child. Allegations that parental custody
would be detrimental to the child, other than a statement of that
ultimate fact, shall not appear in the pleadings. The court may, in
its discretion, exclude the public from the hearing on this issue."9
Section 402 of the Revised Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act also
provides guidelines:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best
interests of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors
including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his cus-
tody;
88. See text accompanying notes 42 and 43 supra.
89. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600 (West Cum. Supp. 1973).
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(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his
parent or parents, his siblings, and any other person who may
significantly affect the child's best interests;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and com-
munity; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that
does not affect his relationship to the child."
The Revised Uniform Adoption Act and the two Children's Bu-
reau Acts merely refer to the best interests of the child without
codifying standards. The Family Law Section of the A.B.A. in 1963
approved a draft Model Child Custody Law, initially drafted by
Professor Foster. The draft states:
In awarding the custody, the Court is to be guided by the following
standards, considerations and procedures:
1) Custody shall be awarded to either parent according to the
best interests of the child.
2) Custody may be awarded to persons other than the father or
the mother whenever such award serves the best interests of the
child. Any person who has had de facto custody of the child in
a stable and wholesome home and is a fit and proper person
shall prima facie be entitled to an award of custody.
3) If a child is of sufficient age and capacity to reason, so as to
form an intelligent preference, his wishes as to custody shall be
considered and be given due weight by the court.
4) Whenever good cause appears therefor, the court may require
an investigation and report concerning the care, welfare and
custody of the minor child of the parties. When so directed by
the Court, investigators or professional personnel attached to or
assisting the Court shall make investigations and reports which
shall be made available to all interested parties and counsel at
least ten days before hearing, and such reports may be received
in evidence if no objection is made, and if objection is made,
may be received in evidence provided that the person or persons
90. The PRoP. REv. UMDA agrees with this language.
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responsible for such report are available for cross-examination
as to any matter which has been investigated.
5) The Court may hear the testimony of any person or expert,
produced by any party or upon the Court's own motion, whose
skill, insight, knowledge or experience is such that his testimony
is relevant to a just and reasonable determination of what is to
the best physical, mental, moral and spiritual well-being of the
child whose custody is at issue.
6) Any custody award shall be subject to modification or change
whenever the best interests of the child require or justify such
modification or change, and wherever practicable, the same
judge who made the original order shall hear the motion or
petition for modification of the prior award.
7) Reasonable visitation rights shall-be awarded to parents and
to any person interested in the welfare of the child in the discre-
tion of the Court, unless it is shown that such rights of visitation
are detrimental to the best interests of the child."
Professor Sanford Katz has suggested certain questions which
should guide the court's decision:
(1) What disposition will provide the child with a stable, orderly, and
loyal parent-child relationship, thus lessening the likelihood that the
state will have to interfere with the relationship in the future?
(2) What disposition will furnish the child with the economic base
necessary for him to become a useful and productive member of so-
ciety?
(3) What disposition will provide the child with an environment that
will foster physical and emotional health?
(4) What disposition will furnish the child with an environment that
will encourage educational goals?
(5) What disposition will provide the child with an environment that
will promote equal respect for all human beings and will give him an
opportunity to mature into a morally stable and responsible adult?"2
Dr. Watson has urged utilization of a new standard, termed the
''psychological best interest of the child" test which he describes as"an organizing concept which can relate and integrate all relevant
91. Proposed Statute, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FAMILY LAW SECTION OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION 38 (1963). See also Foster & Freed, supra note 87, at 628.
92. Katz, supra note 62, at 170.
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data in relation to custodial disposition. '9 3 In this concept Dr. Wat-
son includes a consideration of the child's (1) school needs, (2) ma-
terial needs, (3) need for adequate social stimulation, (4) need for
special therapy, (5) needs relating to the quantity and quality of"parenting," (6) response to parent substitution, (7) psychic status,
(8) need for adult models, and (9) need for stability. 4 Some thirty
years ago Professor Sayre urged that the test should be the "best
interests of all the persons involved. 95 Dr. Watson's arguments ap-
pear valid, however, and some effort should be made to codify in
general language the boundaries of the "best interests of the child"
93. Watson, supra note 84, at 67.
94. Id. at 67-71. See also I.J. BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss: ATTACHMENT 29, 177-209
(1969); S. BRODY, PATTERNS OF MOTHERING 88-89, 356-57 (1956); Despert, supra note 12; I.H.
DEUTSCH, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN 7, 174 (1944); 0. ENGLISH & C. FOSTER, FATHERS ARE
PARENTS, Too (1951); E. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968); H. Modlin, Mother or
Father as Custodian of Child in NATIONAL COLLEGE OF STATE JUDICIARY, FAMImY LAW 81 (1972);
H. MODLIN, READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 319 (Allen, Ferster & Rubin ed. 1968); R. PATTON
& L. GARDNER, GROWTH FAILURE IN MATERNAL DEPRIVATION (1963); J. RICHMOND & E. LIPTON,
Studies on Mental Health of Children with Specific Implications for Pediatricians in
PREVENTION OF MENTAL DISORDERS IN CHILDREN 105-10 (Caplan ed. 1961); Bernstein & Robey,
The Detection and Management of Pediatric Difficulties Created by Divorce, 30 PEDIATRICS
950 (1962); Bradbook, The Relevance of Psychological and Psychiatric Studies to the Future
Development of the Laws Governing the Settlement of Inter-Parental Child Custody
Disputes, 11 J. FAM. L. 557 (1971); Brun, The Child of Divorce in Denmark, 28 BULL. MENNIN-
GER CLINIC 3 (1964); Chumley & Blumenthal, Children's Reactions to Temporary Loss of the
Father, 130 AM. J. PSYCHAT. 778 (1973); Cline & Westman, The Impact of Divorce on the
Family, 2 CHILD PSYCHIAT. & HUMAN DEVELOP. 78 (1971); Foster, The Inter-Relation Between
Law and Psychiatry in Matrimonial Problems, 2 FAM. L.Q. 266 (1968); Gardner, Separation
of the Parents and the Emotional Life of the Child, 40 MENTAL HYGIENE 53 (1956); Gay &
Tonge, The Late Effects of Loss of Parents in Childhood, 113 BRrr. J. PSYCHIAT. 753 (1967);
Katz, A Symposium on Mental Health Concepts in Family Law, 1 FAM. L.Q. 2, 61 (1967);
Landis, The Trauma of Children When Parents Divorce, 22 MARR. & FAM. LIVING 7 (1960);
Lehrman, Psychopathological Aspects of Emotional Divorce, 26 PSYCHOANALYTIC REV. 1
(1939); McDermott, Divorce and Its Psychiatric Sequelae in Children, 23 ARCH. GEN.
PSYCHAT. 421 (1970); McDermott, supra note 12; Nye, Child Adjustment in Broken and in
Unhappy Unbroken Homes, MARR. & FAM. LIVING 356 (Nov., 1957); Otterstrom, The Social
Outlook for Children of Divorce, 3 AcrA GENETICA ET STATISTICA MEDICA 72 (1952); Podell,
Peck & First, Custody-To Which Parent?, 56 MARQ. L. REV. 51 (1972); Sugar, Children of
Divorce, 46 PEDIATRICS 588 (1970); Westman & Cline, Divorce is a Family Affair, 5 FAM. L.Q.
1 (1971); Westman, Cline, Swift & Kramer, Role of Child Psychiatry in Divorce, 23 ARCH.
GEN. PSYCHIAT. 416 (1970); Work & Anderson, Studies in Adoption: Requests for Psychiatric
Treatment, 127 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 948 (1971). Despite this volume of materials, Professor
Robert Levy, the Reporter for the UMDA, has concluded after an extensive review of available
writings of social scientists that "what relevant empirical data exists is almost useless." R.
Levy, supra note 39, at 223. See also Note, Adoption: Psychological Parenthood As the
Controlling Factor in Determining Best Interests of the Child, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 693 (1973).
95. Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, 9 U. Cm. L. REV. 672 (1942).
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test in terms similar to the California or Family Law Section stat-
utes.
C. Modification
Dr. Watson has pointed to the need for stability as a major factor
in the normal development of a child.96 An effort should be made to
build into any legislative scheme certain restrictions on modifica-
tion. Section 409 of the Revised Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
provides that "no motion to modify a custody decree may be made
earlier than 2 years after its date of entry" unless affidavits establish
that the child's "physical, mental, moral, or emotional health" is
seriously endangered.97 The Revised Uniform Adoption Act provides
for the incontestability of the adoption decree after one year, and
the Children's Bureau Adoption Act provides for finality after two
years.98
D. Recognition of Foreign Decrees
One of the most troublesome problems in child custody law has
been the recognition of foreign custody decrees in another state.
The law is presently in a state of mass confusion, and an effort has
been made to clear up this uncertainty by the promulgation of the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act."9 ' Some approach must be
96. Watson, supra note 84, at 71.
97. REV. UMDA § 409(a).
98. REV. UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT § 15; CHILDREN'S BUREAU ADOPTION ACT § 21.
99. See Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); May v.
Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1952); People ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1946). See also
Currie, Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly to Judgments: A Role for Congress, 1964 S. CT. REV.
89 (1964); Ehrenzweig, The Interstate Child and Uniform Legislation: A Plea for Extraliti-
gious Proceedings, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1965); Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody
Decrees, 51 MICH. L. REV. 345 (1953); Hazard, May v. Anderson: Preamble to Family Law
Chaos, 45 VA. L. REV. 379 (1959); Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MICH. L.
REV. 795 (1964); Ratner, Legislative Resolution of the Interstate Child Custody Problem: A
Reply to Professor Currie and a Proposed Uniform Act, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 183 (1965); Rhein-
stein, Jurisdiction in Matters of Child Custody, 26 CONN. BAR. J. 48 (1952); Stansbury,
Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROa. 819 (1944);
Stumberg, The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 42 (1940);
Taintor, Adoption in the Conflict of Laws, 15 U. PITT. L. REV. 222 (1954); Note, Long-Arm
Jurisdiction in Alimony and Custody Cases, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 289 (1973); Comment,
Conflicting Custody Decrees: In Whose Best Interest?, 7 DuQ. L. REv. 262 (1969); Note, Child
Custody Decrees-Interstate Recognition, 49 IOWA L. REV. 1178 (1964); Note, Ford v. Ford:
Full Faith and Credit to Child Custody Decrees?, 73 YALE L.J. 134 (1963).
100. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
[Vol. 8:151
CHILD CUSTODY ADJUDICATION
made to minimize the ability of unsuccessful litigants to "forum
shop" and flee with a child to seek a more favorable custody adjudi-
cation.
CONCLUSION
Divorce reform is a reality in contemporary America, and, as its
momentum gradually builds, many jurisdictions will be taking a
closer look at their domestic relations laws. Unfortunately, the focus
of the reform movement is most often directed at the divorce itself
without taking a broader look at the custody aspect of divorce as
well,'"' and even less attention is paid to the child custody ramifica-
tions of other proceedings. The beginning point of meaningful re-
form of child custody law is obviously the statutory matrix of such
law in each state, and the various recent uniform and model acts
present reasonable alternative proposals for consideration by legis-
lative bodies. No one recommendation offers a panacea, and it is
quite unlikely that such an ideal could be formulated in any such
area of the law so totally dependent on predicting the future course
of human behavior. However, there are certain minimum girders
OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 194 (1968). See Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws,
22 VAND. L. REV. 1207 (1969); Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 3
FAM. L.Q. 304' (1969); Walther, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 54 MARQ. L.
REV. 161 (1971).
101. Foster, The Future of Family Law, 383 ANNALS 129 (1969); Freed & Foster, Divorce
American Style, 383 ANNALS 71 (1969); Gallagher, No-Fault Divorce in Delaware, 59 A.B.A.J.
873 (1973); Goldstein & Gitter, On Abolition of Grounds for Divorce: A Model Statute and
Commentary, 3 FAMi. L.Q. 75 (1969); Lee, Divorce Law Reform in Michigan, 5 J. LAW REFORM
409 (1972); McCurdy, Divorce-A Suggested Approach with Particular Reference To Dissolu-
tion for Living Separate and Apart, 9 VAND. L. REv. 685 (1956); Paulsen, Divorce-
Canterbury Style, 1 VALPARAISO L. REv. 93 (1966); Sass, The Iowa No-Fault Dissolution of
Marriage Law in Action, 18 S.D.L. REV. 629 (1973); Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault
Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REv. 32 (1966).
One argument made in favor of no-fault divorce is that the elimination of fault will lessen
conflict and minimize custody contests. However, in Goddard, A Report on California's New
Divorce Law: Progress and Problems, 6 FAM. L.Q. 405 (1972), the author reported that after
one and a half years experience under the new law, there was "at least as much bitterness in
contested cases involving child custody under the new law as there was under the prior law."
Id. at 418-19. A recent note has criticized the child custody aspects of many no-fault divorce
plans. Note, Alimony, Property Settlement and Child Custody Under the New Divorce Stat-
utes: No-fault Is Not Enough, 22 CATH. U. L. REV. 365 (1973). Dr. Lawrence Kubie has
suggested an alternate approach to child custody disputes by using mediation by a child
custody committee in Kubie, Provisions for the Care of Children of Divorced Parents: A New
Legal Instrument, 73 YALE L.J. 1197 (1964).
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that can be fabricated into a rational whole. The skeleton of the
structure must comport with the requirements of due process to
minimize the risk of collateral attack and to similarly discourage
efforts to relitigate awards because of dissatisfaction with the pro-
cess.
The role of counsel must be enlarged, not only for the child but
also for indigent, incompetent and other minor parties to the pro-
ceeding. The provision of counsel should also be more within the
context of advocacy rather than within the framework of a relatively
passive guardian ad litem concept. Obviously, there is a significant
need for greater interdisciplinary training and communication and
for an enhanced understanding of the complementary roles of var-
ious professionals in the search for an appropriate disposition. The
problem of court organization must be faced and similar judicial
functions integrated into a Family Court which is properly staffed
to help focus the scope of judicial inquiry. Statutory guidelines
which comport with our best understanding of the nature of child
development must be framed to eliminate the vagueness of the
"best interests of the child" test.
Courts and counsel must further recognize that the child is often
a pawn in a larger game played by the adults among themselves.
The decree ultimately entered should be the product of a rational
and enlightened decisional process, and the system must have suffi-
cient confidence in the process to "case harden" the decree so as to
minimize the possibility of modification. Modification should only
be predicated upon serious questions relating to the physical, psy-
chological and emotional health of the child. The court should be
required to use a two-stage modification proceeding, the initial
stage of which is an ex parte hearing based on affidavits which
obviates the necessity for periodic adversary hearings. Foreign cus-
tody awards should be accorded the same presumption of regularity
and finality that the forum's decrees are accorded.
However, even an optimum statutory modification will not guar-
antee desirable adjudicatory processes as there is still an evidentiary
task of crucial importance. Courts must draw on the knowledge and
research of other disciplines such as psychiatry, psychology, theol-
ogy, education, sociology, social work, and education so that those
fields may demonstrate the extent to which various characteristics
of the child and the custodial claimants are significant in achieving
the objective of a healthy parent-child relationship. The behavioral
[Vol. 8:151
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sciences can also help to supply answers to such critical questions
as the effect of parental personalities and behavior on the child, the
extent to which the peer group and other institutions and aspects
of the environment outside the family affect the child, and the
immediate and long range impact on the child's maturation and
socialization. Through a coordinate juxtaposition of statutory re-
form and decisional re-examination we can hopefully develop an
approach to child custody matters which will maximize the possibil-
ity that the child is the true beneficiary of the adjudicatory process
and not the parents or an agency. If we can approximate these
objectives, we may have finally found a viable substitute for Solo-
mon's sword.
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APPENDIX
Revised Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act'"'
SECTION 306. [Separation Agreement.]
(a) To promote amicable settlement of disputes between parties
to a marriage attendant upon their separation or the dissolution of
their marriage, the parties may enter into a Written separation
agreement containing provisions for disposition of any property
owned by either of them, maintenance of either of them, and sup-
port, custody, and visitation of their children.
(b) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or for legal separa-
tion, the terms of the separation agreement, except those providing
for the support, custody, and visitation of children, are binding
upon the court unless it finds, after considering the economic cir-
cumstances of the parties and any other relevant evidence produced
by the parties, on their own motion or on request of the court, that
the separation agreement is unconscionable.
(c) If the court finds the separation agreement unconscionable, it
may request the parties to submit a revised separation agreement
or may make orders for the disposition of property, maintenance,
and support.
(f) Except for terms concerning the support, custody, or visitation
of children, the decree may expressly preclude or limit modification
of terms set forth in the decree if the separation agreement so pro-
vides. Otherwise, terms of a separation agreement set forth in the
decree are automatically modified by modification of the decree.
SECTION 310. [Representation of Child.]
The court may appoint an attorney to represent the interests of a
minor or dependent child with respect to his support, custody, and
visitation. The court shall enter an order for costs, fees, and dis-
bursements in favor of the child's attorney. The order shall be made
against either or both parents, except that, if the responsible party
is indigent, the costs, fees, and disbursements shall be borne by the
[appropriate agency].
102. The only sections and portions of sections set forth here are those relating directly to
custody adjudications.
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SECTION 401. [Jurisdiction; Commencement of Proceeding.]
(a) A court of this State competent to decide child custody mat-
ters has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by ini-
tial or modification decree if:
(1) this State (i) is the home State of the child at the time of
commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home
State within 6 months before commencement of the proceeding and
the child is absent from this State because of his removal or reten-
tion by a person claiming his custody or for other reason, and a
parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this State; or
(2) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this State
assume jurisdiction because (i) the child and his parents, or the
child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with
this State, and (ii) there is available in this State substantial evi-
dence concerning the child's present or future care, protection,
training, and personal relationships; or
(3) the child is physically present in this State and (i) has been
abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect him
because he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment
or abuse or is neglected or dependent; or
(4) (i) no other State has jurisdiction under prerequisites sub-
stantially in accordance with paragraphs (1), (2) or (3), or another
State has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this
State is the more appropriate forum to determine custody of the
child, and (ii) it is in his best interest that the court assume jurisdic-
tion.
(b) Except under paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a), physi-
cal presence in this State of the child, or of the child and one of the
contestants, is not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court
of this State to make a child custody determination.
(c) Physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a prere-
quisite for jurisdiction to determine his custody.
(d) A child custody proceeding is commenced in the [ ]
court:
(1) by a parent, by filing a petition
(i) for dissolution or legal separation; or
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(ii) for custody of the child in the [county, judicial district]
in which he is permanently resident or found; or
(2) by a person other than a parent, by filing a petition for
custody of the child in the [county, judicial district] in which he
is permanently resident or found, but only if he is not in the physical
custody of one of his parents
(e) Notice of a child custody proceeding shall be given to the
child's parent, guardian, and custodian, who may appear, be heard,
and file a responsive pleading. The court, upon a showing of good
cause, may permit intervention of other interested parties.
SECTION 402. [Best Interests of Child.]' 3
SECTION 403. [Temporary Orders.]'"4
SECTION 404. [Interviews.]
(a) The court may interview the child in chambers to ascertain
the child's wishes as to his custodian and as to visitation. The court
may permit counsel to be present at the interview. The court shall
cause a record of the interview to be made and to be part of the
record in the case.
(b) The court may seek the advice of professional personnel,
whether or not employed by the court on a regular basis. The advice
given shall be in writing and made available by the court to counsel
upon request. Counsel may examine as a witness any professional
personnel consulted by the court.
SECTION 405. [Investigations and Reports.]
(a) In contested custody proceedings, and in other custody pro-
ceedings if a parent or the child's custodian so requests, the court
may order an investigation and report concerning custodial arrange-
ments for the child. The investigation and report may be made by
[the court social service agency, the staff of the juvenile court, the
local probation or welfare department, or a private agency employed
by the court for the purpose].
103. See text accompanying note 90 supra.
104. This section provides for temporary custody orders after an uncontested affidavit or
hearing.
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(b) In preparing his report concerning a child, the investigator
may consult any person who may have information about the child
and his potential custodial arrangements. Upon order of the court,
the investigator may refer the child to professional personnel for
diagnosis. The investigator may consult with and obtain informa-
tion from medical, psychiatric, or other expert persons who have
served the child in the past without obtaining the consent of the
parent or the child's custodian; but the child's consent must be
obtained if he has reached the age of 16, unless the court finds that
he lacks mental capacity to consent. If the requirements of subsec-
tion (c) are fulfilled, the investigator's report may be received in
evidence at the hearing.
(c) The court shall mail the investigator's report to counsel and
to any party not represented by counsel at least 10 days prior to the
hearing. The investigator shall make available to counsel and to any
party not represented by counsel the investigator's file of underlying
data, and reports, complete texts of diagnostic reports made to the
investigator pursuant to the provisions of subsection (b), and the
names and addresses of all persons whom the investigator has con-
sulted. Any party to the proceeding may call the investigator and
any person whom he has consulted for cross-examination. A party
may not waive his right of cross-examination prior to the hearing.
SECTION 406. [Hearings.]
(a) Custody proceedings shall receive priority in being set for
hearing.
(b) The court may tax as costs the payment of necessary travel
and other expenses incurred by any person whose presence at the
hearing the court deems necessary to determine the best interest of
the child.
(c) The court without a jury shall determine questions of law and
fact. If it finds that a public hearing may be detrimental to the
child's best interest, the court may exclude the public from a cus-
tody hearing, but may admit any person who has a direct and legiti-
mate interest in the particular case or a legitimate educational or
research interest in the work of the court.
(d) If the court finds it necessary to protect the child's welfare
that the record of any interview, report, investigation, or testimony
in a custody proceeding be kept secret, the court may make an
appropriate order sealing the record.
1974]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
SECTION 407. [Visitation.]
(a) A parent not granted custody of the child is entitled to reason-
able visitation rights unless the court finds, after a hearing, that
visitation would endanger seriously the child's physical, mental,
moral, or emotional health.
(b) The court may modify an order granting or denying visitation
rights wherever modification would serve the best interest of the
child; but the court shall not restrict a parent's visitation rights
unless it finds that the visitation would endanger seriously the
child's physical, mental, moral, or emotional health.
SECTION 408. [Judicial Supervision.]
(a) Except as otherwise agreed by the parties in writing at the
time of the custody decree, the custodian may determine the child's
upbringing, including his education, health care, and religious
training, unless the court after hearing, finds, upon motion by the
noncustodial parent, that in the absence of a specific limitation of
the custodian's authority, the child's physical health would be en-
dangered or his emotional development significantly impaired.
(b) If both parents or all contestants agree to the order, or if the
court finds that in the absence of the order the child's physical
health would be endangered or his emotional development signifi-
cantly impaired, the court may order the [local probation or welfare
department, court social service agency] to exercise continuing su-
pervision over the case to assure that the custodial or visitation
terms of the decree are carried out.
SECTION 409. [Modification.]
(a) No motion to modify a custody decree may be made earlier
than 2 years after its date, unless the court permits it to be made
on the basis of affidavits that there is reason to believe the child's
present environment may endanger seriously his physical, mental,
moral, or emotional health.
(b) If a court of this State has jurisdiction pursuant to the Uni-
form Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, the court shall not modify a
prior custody decree unless it finds, upon the basis of facts that have
arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at
the time of entry of the prior decree, that a change has occurred in
the circumstances of the child or his custodian, and that the modifi-
cation is necessary to serve the best interest of the chlid. In applying
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these standards the court shall retain the custodian appointed pur-
suant to the prior decree unless:
(1) the custodian agrees to the modification;
(2) the child has been integrated into the family of the peti-
tioner with consent of the custodian; or
(3) the child's present environment endangers seriously his
physical, mental, moral, or emotional health, and the harm likely
to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by its advan-
tages to him.
(c) Attorney fees and costs shall be assessed against a party seek-
ing modification if the court finds that the modification action is
vexatious and constitutes harassment.
SECTION 410. [Affidavit Practice.] A party seeking a temporary
custody order or modification of a custody decree shall submit to-
gether with his moving papers an affidavit setting forth facts sup-
porting the requested order or modification and shall give notice,
together with a copy of his affidavit, to other parties to the proceed-
ing, who may file opposing affidavits. The court shall deny the
motion unless it finds that adequate cause for hearing the motion
is established by the affidavits, in which case it shall set a date for
hearing on an order to show cause why the requested order or modi-
fication should not be granted.
Proposed Revised Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act' °5
SECTION 306. [Separation Agreement.]
(b) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or for legal separa-
tion, the court shall examine the terms of any separation agreement
and if found to be fair and reasonable shall approve them and upon
request may incorporate such terms in the decree, provided, that in
the case of terms relating to child support, custody and visitation,
before approving such terms, the court shall be satisfied that in
addition to being fair and reasonable, such terms promote the best
interests of the child.
SECTION 310. [Representation of Child or Incompetent Spouse.]
105. The only sections set forth here are those wherein the Family Law Section disagrees
with the custody provisions of the REv. UMDA.
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(a) In any proceeding brought pursuant to this Act, the court
shall appoint an attorney, who may be a member of the Court sys-
tem personnel, to independently represent the interests of a minor,
dependent or incompetent child with respect to support, custody,
visitation and any other matter dealing with the children's welfare
in such proceeding.
(b) The court shall also aijpoint an attorney [guardian ad
litem] to represent the interests of an incompetent spouse who does
not have a general guardian and is not represented by his own attor-
ney in such proceeding.
SECTION 408. [Judicial Supervision.]
(a) Except as otherwise agreed by the parties in writing at the
time of the custody decree, the custodian may determine the child's
upbringing, including his education, health, care, and religious
training, unless the court after hearing, finds, upon motion by the
noncustodial parent, that in the absence of a specific limitation of
the custodian's authority, the child's physical, mental, moral or
emotional health would be endangered or seriously impaired.
(b) If both parents or all contestants agree to the order, or if the
court finds that in the absence of the order the child's physical,
mental, moral or emotional health would be endangered or seriously
impaired, the court may order the [local probation or welfare de-
partment, court social service agency] to exercise continuing super-
vision over the case to assure that the custodial or visitation terms
of the decree are carried out.
An Act for Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship'"6
SECTION 1. [Purpose.]
SECTION 2. [Definitions.]
When used in this Act, unless the text otherwise requires:
a. "Court" means the ( ) court.
b. "Child" or "Minor" means a person less than 18 years of age.
c. The singular includes the plural, the plural the singular, and
106. This has been edited to delete the sections that are not substantive in nature and to
delete §§ 15-18 relating to Effective Date, Separability, Construction and Repeal.
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the masculine the feminine, when consistent with the intent of the
Act.
d. "Neglected" used with respect to a child refers to a situation
in which the child lacks proper parental care necessary for his
health, morals, and well-being.
e. "Legal custody" means a status created by court order em-
bodying the following rights and responsibilities:
(1) the right to have the physical possession of the child,
(2) the right and the duty to protect, train and discipline the
child, and
(3) the responsibility to provide the child with food, shelter,
education and ordinary medical care, provided that such rights and
responsibilities shall be exercised subject to the powers, rights, du-
ties and responsibilities of the guardian of the person and subject
to residual parental rights and responsibilities if these have not been
terminated by judicial decree.
f. "Guardianship of the person" with respect to a minor means
the duty and authority to make important decisions in matters
having a permanent effect on the life and development of the minor,
and to be concerned about the general welfare of the minor. It in-
cludes but is not necessarily limited either in number or kind to:
(1) the authority to consent to marriage, to enlistment in the
armed forces of the United States, and to major medical, psychiatric
and surgical treatment; to represent the minor in legal actions; and
to make other decisions concerning the child of substantial legal
significance;
(2) the authority and duty of reasonable visitation, except to
the extent that such right of visitation has been limited by court
order;
(3) the rights and responsibilities of legal custody except where
legal custody has been vested in another individual or in an author-
ized agency;
(4) when the parent-child relationship has been terminated by
judicial decree with respect to the parents, or only living parent, or
when there is no living parent, the authority to consent to the adop-
tion of the child and to make any other decision concerning the child
which the child's- parents could make.
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g. "Guardian ad litem" means a person appointed by the court
to prbtect the interest of a minor or an incompetent in a case before
the court.
h. "Authorized agency" means a public social agency author-
ized to care for or place children or a voluntary social agency ap-
proved for such purposes by the State through a license, certifica-
tion or otherwise.
i. "Parent" means (1) the mother, (2) a father as to whom a
child is legitimate, (3) a person as to whom a child is presumed to
be a legitimate child, or (4) an adoptive parent; but such term does
not include a parent as to whom the parent-child relationship has
been terminated by judicial decree.
j. "Parent-child relationship" includes all rights, privileges,
duties, and obligations existing between parent and child, including
inheritance rights.
k. "Residual parental rights and responsibilities" means those
rights and responsibilities remaining with the parent (where there
has not been termination of the parent-child relationship by judicial
decree) after the transfer of legal custody and guardianship of the
person, including but not necessarily limited to, the right to reason-
able visitation, consent to adoption, the right to determine the
child's religious affiliation and the responsibility for support.
1. "Protective supervision" means a legal status created by court
order in proceedings not involving violations of law but where the
legal custody of the child is subject to change, whereby the child is
permitted to remain in his home under the supervision of the court
or an agency designated by the court and is subject to return to the
court during the period of protective supervision.
m. "Parties" includes the child and the petitioners.
SECTION 3. [Jurisdiction.]
The [ ] court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions to terminate the parent-child relationship when the child
involved is present in the State.
SECTION 4. [Petition and Grounds.]
(a) A petition may be filed by a parent either directly or through
an authorized agency. The parent-child relationship may be termi-
nated with respect to the parent by whom or on whose behalf such
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petition has been filed, where the court finds that such termination
is in the best interest of the parent and the child.
(b) A petition for termination of the parent-child relationship
with respect to a parent who is not the petitioner may be filed by a
petitioner designated in subsection (c). The petition may be granted
where the court finds that one or more of the following conditions
exists:
(1) that the parent has abandoned the child in that the parent
has made no effort to maintain a parental relationship with such
child,
(2) that the parent has substantially and continuously or re-
peatedly neglected the child,
(3) that the presumptive parent is not a natural parent of the
child,
(4) that the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibili-
ties because of mental illness or mental deficiency, and there are
reasonable grounds to believe that such condition will continue for
a prolonged indeterminate period.
(c) The petition under subsection (b) may be filed by the follow-
ing:
(1) either parent when termination of the parent-child relation-
ship is sought with respect to the other parent,
(2) the guardian of the person or the legal custodian of the child
or the person standing in loco parentis to the child,
(3) an authorized agency,
(4) any other person having a legitimate interest in the matter.
SECTION 5. [Contents of Petition.]
The petition for the termination of the parent-child relationship
shall include, to the best information or belief of the petitioner:
(a) the name and place of residence of the petitioner;
(b) the name, sex, date and place of birth, and residence of the
child;
(c) the basis for the court's jurisdiction;
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(d) the relationship of the petitioner to the child, or the fact that
no relationship exists;
(e) the names, addresses, and dates of birth of the parents;
(f) where the child's parent is a minor, the names and addresses
of said minor's parents or guardian of the person;
(g) the names and addresses of the person having legal custody
or guardianship of the person or acting in loco parentis to the child
or the organization or authorized agency having legal custody or
providing care for the child;
(h) the grounds on which termination of the parent-child rela-
tionship is sought;
(i) the names and addresses of the persons and authorized
agency or officer thereof to whom or to which legal custody or guard-
ianship of the person of the child might be transferred.
SECTION 6. [Notice-Waiver-Guardian Ad Litem. ]
After a petition has been filed, the court shall set the time and
place for a hearing, and shall cause notice thereof to be given to the
petitioner, the parents of the child, the guardian of the person of the
child, the person having legal custody of the child, any individual
standing in loco parentis to the child, and the guardian ad litem of
any party.
Where the child's parent is a minor, notice shall also be given to
said minor's parents or guardian of the person unless the court is
satisfied, in the exercise of its discretion, that such notice is not in
the best interest of said minor and that it would serve no useful
purpose.
Notice shall be given by personal service. However, where reason-
able efforts to effect personal service have been unsuccessful or
where it shall appear impracticable to attempt such service the
court shall order service by registered or certified mail to the last
known address of the person to be notified and by publication once
a week for 3 successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
within the court's district. The hearing shall take place no sooner
than 10 days after service of notice, or where service is by registered
or certified mail and publication, the hearing shall take place no
sooner than 10 days after the date of last publication.
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Notice and appearance may be waived by a parent in writing
before the court or in the presence of, and witnessed by, a clerk of
court or social worker attached to and designated by the court,
provided that such parent has been apprised by the court or by such
person of the meaning and consequences of the termination action.
The parent who has executed such a waiver shall not be required to
appear. Where the parent is a minor, the waiver shall be effective
only upon approval by the court.
When termination of the parent-child relationship is sought
under Sec. 4(b)(4), the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for
the alleged incompetent parent. The court may, in any other case,
appoint a guardian ad litem, as may be deemed necessary or desira-
ble, for any party.
SECTION 7. [Social Study Prior to Disposition.]
Upon the filing of a petition, the court shall direct that a social
study be made either by social service personnel attached to the
court or by an authorized agency and that a report in writing of such
study be submitted to the court prior to the hearing, except that
where an authorized agency, is a petitioner, either in its own right
or on behalf of a parent, a report in writing of the social study made
by such agency shall accompany the petition. The court may order
additional social study as it deems necessary. The social study shall
include the circumstances of the petition, the social history, the
present condition of the child and parents, proposed plans for the
child, and such other facts as may be pertinent to the parent-child
relationship, and the report submitted shall include a recommenda-
tion and the reasons therefor as to whether or not the parent-child
relationship should be terminated. Where the parent is a minor, if
the report does not include a statement of contact with the parents
of said minor, the reasons therefor shall be set forth. The purpose
of the social study is to aid the court in making disposition of the
petition and shall be considered by the court prior thereto.
SECTION 8. [Hearing.]
Cases under this Act shall be heard by the court without a jury.
The hearing may be conducted in an informal manner and may be
adjourned from time to time. Stenographic notes or mechanical
recording of the hearing shall be required as in other civil cases in
the ( ), unless the parties waive the right to such record and the
court so orders. The general public shall be excluded and only such
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persons admitted whose presence is requested by any person enti-
tled to notice under Sec. 6 or as the judge shall find to have a direct
interest in the case or in the work of the court; provided that persons
so admitted shall not disclose any information secured at the hear-
ing which would identify an individual child or parent. In addition,
the court may require the presence of witnesses (including persons
making any report, study or examination which is before the court
when such persons are reasonably available) deemed necessary to
the disposition of the petition, except that a parent who has exe-
cuted a waiver pursuant to Sec. 6 shall not be required to appear at
the hearing.
When termination of the parent-child relationship is sought
under Sec. 4 (b) the parent or guardian ad litem shall be notified
as soon as practicable after the filing of a petition and prior to the
start of a hearing of his right to have counsel, and if counsel is
requested and the parent is financially unable to employ counsel,
counsel shall be provided.
The court's finding with respect to grounds for termination shall
be based upon a preponderance of evidence under the rules applica-
ble to the trial of civil causes, provided that relevant and material
information of any nature, including that contained in reports, stud-
ies or examinations, may be admitted and relied upon to the extent
of its probative value. When information contained in a report,
study or examination is admitted in evidence, the person making
such a report, study or examination shall be subject to both direct
and cross-examination when he is reasonably available.
Where the termination is sought under Sec. 4(b)(4), to support a
decree of termination, evidence of the alleged condition shall be no
less than that required to support a commitment to an institution
for the mentally ill or mentally deficient under ( ).
SECTION 9. [Decree.]
Every order of the court terminating the parent-child relationship
or transferring legal custody or guardianship of the person of the
child or providing for protective supervision of the child shall be in
writing and shall recite the findings upon which such order is based,
including findings pertaining to the court's jurisdiction. Such order
shall be conclusive and binding on all persons from the date of
entry.
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(1) If the court finds grounds for the termination of the parent-
child relationship it shall terminate such relationship and:
(a) appoint an individual as guardian of the child's person, or
(b) appoint an individual as guardian of the child's person and vest
legal custody in another individual or in an authorized agency, or
(c) where it is alleged in the petition that the termination is in con-
templation of adoption, appoint an official of an authorized agency
as guardian of the child's person and vest legal custody in such
agency.
The court shall also make an order fixing responsibility for the
child's support. The parent-child relationship may be terminated
with respect to one parent without affecting the relationship be-
tween the child and the other parent.
(2) Where the court does not order termination of the parent-child
relationship, it shall dismiss the petition; provided, however, that
where the court finds that the best interest of the child requires
substitution or supplementation of parental care and supervision, it
shall make an order placing the child under protective supervision,
or vesting temporary legal custody in an authorized agency and
fixing responsibility for temporary child support, and shall certify
the case to an appropriate court for such further action as may be
necessary.
SECTION 10. [Effect of Decree.]
An order terminating the parent-child relationship shall divest
the parent and the child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and
obligations, including rights of inheritance, with respect to each
other.
SECTION 11. [Court Costs.]
All court costs including costs of giving notice and advertising
shall be paid by the petitioners. The court, however, may suspend
such costs where payment would work a hardship on the petitioner
or would be otherwise inappropriate.
SECTION 12. [Records.]
The files and records of the court in any proceedings had under
this Act shall be kept in a separate locked file and shall be withheld
from public inspection, but shall be open to inspection by persons
having a legitimate interest in the case and their attorneys and by
1974]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
an authorized agency to which legal custody of the child has been
transferred. Such files and records may, pursuant to rule of court
or special order of the court, be inspected by other persons and
agencies having a legitimate interest in the protection, welfare, or
treatment of the child or in research studies. As used in this section,
the words "files and records" include the court docket and entries
therein, the petitions and other papers filed in any case, transcripts
of testimony taken by the court, and findings, orders, and decrees,
and other writings filed in proceedings before the court, other than
social records.
Social records shall be withheld from public inspection except
that information from such records may be furnished to persons and
agencies having a legitimate interest in the protection, welfare, and
treatment of the child or in research studies, in such manner as the
court determines. As used in this section, the words "social records"
include the social service records of the court, the social studies and
reports referred to in Sec. 7, and related papers, and correspond-
ence, including medical, psychological, and psychiatric studies and
reports, either in the possession of the court or authorized agency.
No person shall be entitled to make copies of such files and re-
cords or social records or parts thereof unless the court so orders.
It shall be unlawful, except for purposes for which files and re-
cords or social records or parts thereof or information therefrom
have been released pursuant to this section, or except for purposes
permitted by special order of the court, and in accordance with any
applicable rules of the court, for any person to disclose, receive, or
make use of, or authorize, knowingly permit, participate in, or ac-
quiesce in the use of any information concerning any person before
the court directly or indirectly derived from the files and records or
communications of the court, or social records, or acquired in the
course of the performance of official duties.
Any person who shall disclose information in violation of the pro-
visions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon
conviction thereof shall be fined not to exceed $500 or imprisoned
for a period not to exceed 6 months or both.
SECTION 13. [Appeals.]
Any party aggrieved by any order or decree of the court may
appeal to the [appellate] court for review of questions of law. The
[Vol. 8:151
CHILD CUSTODY ADJUDICATION
procedure of such an appeal shall be governed by the same provision
applicable to appeals from the [highest court of general trial juris-
diction]. The pendency of an appeal or application therefor shall
not suspend the order of the court regarding a child.
SECTION 14. [Termination Decrees of Other States.]
When the relationship of parent and child has been terminated
by judicial decree in another State, such decree shall have the same
force and effect as to matters within the jurisdiction of this State
as though it had been granted by a court of this State.
An Act for the Adoption of Children"0 7
SECTION 1. [Purpose.]
SECTION 2. [Definitions.'0]
SECTION 3. [Who May Be Adopted.]
Any child present within this State at the time the petition for
adoption is filed may be adopted.
SECTION 4. [Who May Adopt.]
The following persons if they are residents of this State are eligi-
ble to adopt children:
(a) the husband and wife jointly, or either the husband or wife if the
other spouse is a parent of the child;
(b) an unmarried adult;
(c) a married adult who by judicial decree has been accorded the
right to reside separate and apart from his or her spouse.
SECTION 5. [Venue.]
Adoption proceedings must be brought in the court of the county
or district where the petitioners reside.
SECTION 6. [Prerequisites to Petition.]
Except when a petition is filed by relatives of the child within the
107. This has been edited to delete sections that are not substantive and which are repeti-
tive of sections in TERMINATION AcT.
108. The only differences between this section and § 2 of the TERMINATION AT are the
inclusion of definitions for "Adult," "Child Placement Agency" and "Relatives of the child
within the second degree either by blood or affinity."
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second degree either by blood or affinity, no petition for adoption
shall be entertained unless prior to the filing of the petition
(1) A decree of termination of the parent-child relationship
with respect to each living parent of the child sought to be adopted
has been entered; and
(2) the child sought to be adopted has been placed for adoption
with the petitioners by a child placement agency.
SECTION 7. [Petition.]
A petition for adoption shall be filed in duplicate, verified by the
petitioners, and shall specify to the best of their information or
belief:
(1) The full names, ages, and place of residence of the petition-
ers, and if they are married, the place and date of the marriage; and
their relationship, if any, to the child;
(2) except where the petitioners are relatives of the child within
the second degree either by blood or affinity, an allegation that a
decree of termination of the parent-child relationship with respect
to each living parent of the child sought to be adopted has been
entered and that such child was placed for adoption with the peti-
tioners by a child placement agency, together with the name of said
agency and the date of said placement;
(3) the date and place of birth of the child;
(4) the name of the child used in the proceeding, and if a
change in name is desired, the new name;
(5) that it is the desire of the petitioners that the relationship
of parent and child be established between them and the child;
(6) a full description and statement of value of all property
owned or possessed by the child.
SECTION 8. [Consents Required.]
(a) Where a petition is filed by relatives of the child within the
second degree either by blood or affinity, no adoption of such child
may be ordered unless the written consent to the adoption of the
child by the petitioners is given by each parent of the child or if
there is no parent, by the guardian of the child's person. A minor
parent may consent to an adoption but his consent shall be effective
only when concurred in by his parents or his guardian of the person.
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(b) Where a petition is filed by any other persons, no adoption of
a child may be ordered unless the written consent to the adoption
of such child by the petitioners is given by the child's guardian of
the person.
Where the consent of a guardian of the child's person is required,
the court may dispense with such consent only if it finds that the
withholding of such consent is arbitrary and capricious.
Consents shall be acknowledged before an officer authorized to
take acknowledgments and witnessed by a representative of a child
placement agency or by a representative of the court.
(c) Where the child is 12 years of age or older, the adoption shall
not be granted without his consent. Such consent shall be given in
court or shall be in writing in such form as the court may direct.
SECTION 9. [Filing of Consents.]
Written consents required by Sec. 8(a) shall be attached to the
adoption petition. In the case of a consent by a guardian of the
child's person, the guardian shall file directly with the court satis-
factory evidence of his authority to consent to adoption of the child.
Where the parent-child relationship has been terminated by judicial
decree a certified copy of the termination decree shall be filed di-
rectly with the court by the guardian of the child's person.
SECTION 10. [Withdrawal of Consent.]
Withdrawal of any consent filed in connection with a petition for
adoption hereunder shall not be permitted, except that the court
after notice and opportunity to be heard is given to the petitioner
in the adoption proceeding, to the person seeking to withdraw con-
sent and to an authorized agency involved in this proceeding, may,
if it finds that the best interest of the child will be furthered thereby,
issue a written order permitting the withdrawal of such consent. The
entry of an order of adoption renders any consent irrevocable.
SECTION 11. [Notice-Service.]
After a petition has been filed, the court shall set the time and
place for a hearing and shall cause notice thereof to be served on the
petitioners, on the child placement agency, if any, that placed the
child with the petitioners for adoption, and on any authorized
agency responsible for making the social study required by Sec. 12.
Notice shall be given by personal service or by registered or certified
mail.
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SECTION 12. [Social Study Prior to Disposition.]'0 9
SECTION 13. [The Child Living Within the Proposed Adoptive
Home.]
The hearing on the petition shall not be held until the child has
lived 12 months in the home of the petitioners under the supervision
of an authorized agency. The 12 months' residence may be waived
by order of the court on the motion of the petitioners or an author-
ized agency involved in this proceeding if the court is satisfied that
the best interest of the child will be furthered thereby.
SECTION 14. [Hearing.]110
SECTION 15. [Decree.]
If after the hearing and consideration of the report required by
Sect. 12, the court is satisfied that the requirements of this Act have
been met and that the adoption is in the best interest of the child,
the court shall make an order granting the adoption. The order may
change the name of the child to that of the petitioners. The order
of the court shall be in writing and shall recite the findings upon
which such order is based including findings pertaining to the
court's jurisdiction. Such order shall be conclusive and binding on
all persons from the date of entry.
Birth certificates
[Incorporate by reference to appropriate sections of the State
birth registration law, preferably in accordance with Secs. 16 and
17 of the Model State Vital Statistics Act: 1959 Revision]. The clerk
of court shall mail a copy of every adoption decree to the State
(department of public welfare).
SECTION 16. [Effect of Adoption Decree.]
(a) Upon entry of the decree of adoption, the relationship of par-
ent and child and all the legal rights, privileges, duties, obligations,
and other legal consequences of the natural relationship of child and
parent shall thereafter exist between the adopted person and the
109. This section is substantially identical to § 7 of the TERMINATION ACT.
110. This section is substantially identical to § 8 of the TERMINATION AcT.
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adoptive parents the same as though the child were born to the
*adoptive parents in lawful wedlock. The adopted child shall be enti-
tled to inherit real and personal property from and through the
adoptive parents and the adoptive parents shall be entitled to in-
herit real and personal property from and through the adopted child
the same as though the child were born to the adoptive parents in
lawful wedlock.
(b) Upon entry of the decree of adoption, the relationship of par-
ent and child between the adopted person and the persons who were
his parents just prior to the decree of adoption shall be completely
severed and all the legal rights, privileges, duties, obligations, and
other legal consequences of the relationship shall cease to exist,
including the right of inheritance, except that where the adoption
is by the spouse of the child's parent, the relationship of the child
to such parent shall remain unchanged by the decree of adoption.
SEC IrON 17. [Withdrawal or Denial of Petition.]
(a) In any case in which the petition is withdrawn or denied the
court shall order the removal of the child from the proposed adop-
tive home if the court finds that such removal is in the child's best
interest. If such removal is ordered, the court shall vest temporary
legal custody of the child in an authorized agency with power to
remove the child and to plan for the child's welfare and the court
shall fix responsibility for temporary child support, provided, how-
ever, that where the parent-child relationship has been terminated
by judicial decree, the authorized agency or individual granted legal
custody of the child by such decree shall, unless the court otherwise
orders, continue to act in such capacity, and such individual or
authorized agency shall be similarly empowered to remove the child
from the proposed adoptive home. The court shall in addition cer-
tify the case to an appropriate court for such further action as may
be necessary.
(b) In any case in which the petition is withdrawn or denied and
the court does not order the removal of the child, the court shall
certify the case to an appropriate court for such further action as
may be necessary.
SECTION 18. [Abatement.]
In the event of the death of the petitioner or of the petitioners,
the proceeding shall abate and the petition for adoption shall be
dismissed, but where there are two petitioners and one of the peti-
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tioners dies, the proceeding shall continue uninterrupted as if the
death had not occurred.
SECTION 19. [Records.]",
SECTION 20. [Appeals. §112
SECTION 21. [Invalidation.]
After 2 years from the date the adoption decree is entered, any
irregularity in the proceeding shall be deemed cured and the valid-
ity of the decree shall not thereafter be subject to attack on any such
ground in any collateral or direct proceeding.
SECTION 22. [Subsequent Adoption.]
The adoption of an adopted person is authorized, and in that case,
the references to the parents are to adoptive parents.
SECTION 23. [Adoption Decrees of Other States.]
Where an adoption has been judicially decreed by a court in an-
other State, such decree shall have the same force and effect as to
matters within the jurisdiction of this State as though it had been
granted by a court of this State.13
111. This section is substantially identical to § 12 of the TERMINATION ACT.
112. This section is substantially identical to § 13 of the TERMINATION Acr.
113. The language of § 23 is substantially identical to that of § 14 of the TERMINATION AcT
and has the same effect. §§ 24-27 relating to Effective Date, Separability, Construction and
Repeal are not included herein.
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